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ABSTRACT 
This study uses an economy-wide, dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model to analyze 
the ability of growth in various agricultural subsectors to accelerate overall economic growth and reduce 
poverty in Nigeria over the next years (2009-17). In addition, econometric methods are used to assess 
growth requirements in agricultural public spending and the relationship between public services and 
farmers’ use of modern technology. The DCGE model results show that if certain agricultural subsectors 
can reach the growth targets set by the Nigerian government, the country will see 9.5 percent annual 
growth in agriculture and 8.0 percent growth of GDP over the next years. The national poverty rate will 
fall to 30.8 percent by 2017, more than halving the 1996 poverty rate of 65.6 percent and thereby 
accomplishing the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1). This report emphasizes that in designing 
an agricultural strategy and prioritizing growth, it is important to consider the following four factors at the 
subsectoral level: (i) the size of a given subsector in the economy; (ii) the growth-multiplier effects 
occurring through linkages of the subsector with the rest of the economy; (iii) the subsector-led poverty-
reduction-growth elasticity; and (iv) the market opportunities and price effects for individual agricultural 
products.  
In analyzing the public investments that would be required to support a 9.5 percent annual growth 
in agriculture, this study first estimates the growth elasticity of public investments using historical 
spending and agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) growth data. The results show that a 1 percent 
increase in agricultural spending is associated with a 0.24 percent annual increase in agricultural TFP. 
With such low elasticity, agricultural investments must grow at 23.8 percent annually to support a 9.5 
percent increase in agriculture. However, if the spending efficiency can be improved by 70 percent, the 
required agricultural investment growth becomes 13.6 percent per year. The study also finds that 
investments outside agriculture benefit growth in the agricultural sector. Thus, assessments of required 
growth in agricultural spending should include the indirect effects of nonagricultural investments and 
emphasize the importance of improving the efficiency of agricultural investments. To further show that 
efficiency in agricultural spending is critically important to agricultural growth, this study utilizes 
household-level data to empirically show that access to agricultural services has a significantly positive 
effect on the use of modern agricultural inputs.  
Keywords: poverty reduction, agricultural growth, public investment, agricultural services, Nigeria 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Poverty remains a challenge in Nigeria’s development efforts. Although the national  poverty rate was 54 
percent , or 69 million people, in 2004, which was reduced from its highest level in the early 1990s, it is 
still two times higher than the poverty rate in 1980. On the other hand, relatively impressive economic 
growth rates were recorded during the 2000-07 period. Compared to the periods of 1990-94 and 1995-99, 
when the economy grew at 2.6 and 3.0 percent per year, respectively, the annual growth rate of GDP rose 
to 7.3 percent during 2000-07. This suggests that while economic growth is necessary for the country’s 
development, it does not automatically impact poverty reduction. Notably, the agricultural sector has been 
a key driver of recent growth in Nigeria. Between 1990 and 2006, the agricultural and oil sectors 
accounted for 47 and 39 percent of national growth, respectively. Despite the high dependence of 
government revenues and national export earnings on the oil sector, the agricultural sector has comprised 
the most important source of growth in recent years. Furthermore, as agriculture is the single largest 
employer among sectors (70 percent of labor force) (NBS 2006) and labor is the main and sometimes 
only asset for the poor (Agenor et al. 2003), the agricultural sector outperforms all other sectors in 
reducing poverty.  
In recognition of the importance of the agricultural sector in Nigeria, the government has initiated 
and endorsed many national and international projects, programs and policies aimed at rapidly growing 
the sector, and thereby reducing poverty. These include the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategies (NEEDS and NEEDS II), the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) and the National Food Security Program (NFSP), as well as 
product-specific programs, such as the presidential initiatives on cassava, rice and other crops. Motivating 
pay offs to these programs have been seen; for example, agriculture’s growth rose from 3.5 percent per 
annum in 1990-99 to 5.9 percent per annum in 2000-07, and poverty decreased from 65.6 percent in 1996 
to 54.4 percent in 2004. Despite these accomplishments, however, further efforts will be necessary if we 
hope to lift more people out of poverty and meet the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of 
halving the proportion of people who live under the poverty line, with incomes of less than US$1 dollar 
per day.  
Against this background, the present study analyzes the agricultural growth and investment 
options that could support the formation of a more comprehensive rural development component under 
NEEDS II, in alignment with the principles and objectives collectively defined by African countries as 
part of the broader NEPAD agenda. In particular, the study seeks to position Nigeria’s agricultural sector 
and rural economy within NEEDS II. For these purposes and to assist policy makers and other 
stakeholders in making informed long-term decisions, we herein develop an economy-wide, dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model for Nigeria, and use it to analyze the linkages and trade-
offs between economic growth and poverty reduction at both the macro- and microeconomic levels. After 
introducing the DCGE model in the next section, we have considered two scenarios using the DCGE 
model. In the first scenario in Section 3, we consider a growth path following the country's current growth 
trends and we define it as a baseline scenario. In the second scenario in Section 4 we simulate a growth 
path along which growth at the agricultural subsector levels is accelerated to meet with the targets set by 
the government. Additional growth is assumed from increases in productivity instead of more land 
expansion. In this scenario we also evaluate whether subsector level targets can allow the country's total 
agriculture to grow at 10 percent annually, a growth target defined in NEEDS II. We call this scenario a 
'CAADP scenario' though the targeted 10 percent of agricultural growth is much higher than the 6 percent 
of CAADP goal. In Section 5, we attempt to quantify the public resources that should be funneled to the 
agricultural sector in order to achieve the government’s stated development goals, while in Section 6 we 
turn to analyze the linkages between public services and farmers’ use of modern technology. Section 7 
concludes the paper with major findings and policy implications.  2 
2.  MODELING AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION
1
Previous CGE Models for Nigeria  
  
Previously, CGE modeling has been used to study the Nigerian economy and analyze the ability of 
agriculture and its different subsectors to achieve various poverty and growth goals. These papers include 
those by Iwayemi (1995), the UNDP (1995b), Ajakaiye and Olomola (2003) of the Nigerian Institute of 
Social and Economic Research (NISER), and the analysis done for NEEDS II using the National Planning 
Commission-Center for Econometric and Allied Research (NPC-CEAR) model (NPC 2007). All of these 
models were done at the national level (i.e., they were not disaggregated to the levels of the various 
regional economies) and were relatively aggregated in their sectoral structures. Iwayemi (1995), for 
example, designed a quasi-CGE model to check the consistency of targets laid out in the first perspective 
plan developed during the 1990s (it is not clear whether this model was actually used to analyze policy 
issues). The UNDP (1995b) model was a follow up to that of Iwayemi (1995), and used a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) that comprised 52 sectors, including some agricultural subsectors. However, 
we were unable to find any policy analysis performed using this model.  
In contrast, the NISER (Ajakaiye and Olomola 2003) and NPC-CEAR (NPC 2007) models have 
been successfully used to analyze various economic targets in relation to overall growth targets. The 
NISER model projected the expected growth rates of the economy between 2001 and 2015 based on 
assumptions of future levels of key economic variables, namely the exchange rate, interest rate, minimum 
wage, government capital expenditure, exports, and investments. The analysis for NEEDS II using the 
NPC-CEAR model focused on estimating the sectoral growth rates required to achieve 10 percent growth 
in the economy for 2008-11.  
While the latter two studies linked national growth to that in economic variables and different 
sectors, they did not consider the agricultural sector in detail and did not fully assess the relative roles that 
the different agriculture subsectors can play in accelerating agricultural and economy-wide growth. With 
regard to poverty impacts, the NISER model was limited to concluding that the daily per capita income 
would increase from US$1 in 2001 to US$4.4 in 2015 if the assumed levels of the economic variables 
were met; however, it is not clear how this result was obtained from the model. As for NEEDS II, the 
existing modeling analysis did not clearly distinguish what poverty impact would be expected from the 
‘required’ 10 percent economic growth. Another limitation for both reports was that the analysis could not 
be applied to disaggregated households, and the papers therefore failed to discuss the impact of growth on 
different types of rural and urban households.  
The Dynamic General Equilibrium (DCGE) Model and a Microsimulation Module for 
Nigeria 
A standard static CGE model was developed in the early 2000s at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), as documented by Lofgren (2001). The recursive dynamic version of the CGE model 
incorporates a series of dynamic factors into the standard static CGE model. An early version of the 
DCGE model was first developed by Thurlow (2004), and its recent application to two country case 
studies (in Zambia and Uganda) was done by Diao et al. (2007). We herein develop a DCGE model for 
Nigeria in this study. The DCGE model captures the trade-offs and synergies that come from accelerating 
growth in various agricultural subsectors, as well as the economic inter-linkages between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy. Although our study focuses on the agricultural sector, the DCGE model for 
Nigeria also contains information on nonagricultural sectors. The model examines 62 subsectors in total, 
more than half of which are in agriculture. The examined agricultural crops fall into four broad groups: (i) 
cereal crops, including rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, and millet; (ii) root crops, such as cassava, yam, 
cocoyam, Irish potatoes, and sweet potatoes; (iii) other food crops, including plantain, beans, groundnuts, 
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soybeans, other oil crops, vegetables for domestic use, and fruits for domestic use; and (iv) higher-value 
export-oriented crops, such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil palm, vegetables for export, fruits for export, 
sugar, tobacco, cashew nuts, other nuts, rubber, and other export crops. The DCGE model also identifies 
four primary livestock sectors, namely: cattle, goats and sheep, poultry, and other livestock. To complete 
the agricultural sector, the model also includes forestry and fisheries. Most of the agricultural 
commodities listed above are not only used for domestic consumption or export, they are also used as 
intermediate inputs into various processing activities in the manufacturing sector. The ten agricultural 
processing activities (including eight food-processing activities) identified in the model comprise the 
processing of: beef; goat and sheep meat; poultry meat; eggs; milk; other meats; beverages; other foods; 
textiles; and wood. The agricultural sectors themselves also use inputs produced from nonagricultural 
sectors, such as fertilizer and transport and trade services for crops.  
The DCGE model for Nigeria also captures regional heterogeneity. Rural agricultural production 
is disaggregated across six zones in Nigeria, with representative farmers engaging in different crop- and 
livestock-production strategies across zones. Therefore, the model is calibrated to the initial agricultural 
structure at the zonal level. The representative farmers within each zone respond to changes in production 
technology, commodity demand, and commodity prices by making decisions on how to allocate land and 
family labor across the different crops and livestock subsectors, and whether or not to purchase other 
inputs (e.g., hired labor, capital, and intermediate inputs) in order to maximize their net incomes from 
agriculture. The allocation of labor is also determined by the opportunity to participate in nonagricultural 
activities, which primarily occur in urban areas or rural towns. Such opportunities are modeled from the 
demand side, in that the representative producers in the nonagricultural sectors, when making their 
production decisions, decide on the amount of labor to be hired in, taking market wage rates as given. 
Thus, by capturing production structure at the subnational level, the DCGE model effectively integrates 
the information on different agents and activities into an economy-wide model that can be used to assess 
growth effects at the national level. The DCGE model for Nigeria is therefore an ideal tool for capturing 
the growth linkages, income effects, and price effects resulting from growth acceleration in different 
agricultural sectors. Additional detail on the DCGE model is available in Appendix A.  
Finally, the DCGE model endogenously estimates the impact of alternative growth paths on the 
incomes of various household groups. These household groups are defined based on the six zones and 
rural or urban location, for a total of 12 representative household groups. Each household group is 
aggregated from the Nigeria Living Standards Survey (NLSS) 2003/04 such that all households sampled 
in NLSS 2003/04 can be linked directly to their corresponding representative household in the DCGE 
model. The microsimulation module
2
The Data 
, which contains all households sampled in NLSS 2003/04, is linked 
to the DCGE model. In this macro-to-micro linkage, changes in representative households’ consumption 
patterns and prices in the DCGE model are passed down to their corresponding households in the 
microsimulation module (containing all sampled households from NLSS 2003/04, where the total 
consumption expenditure for each sample household is recalculated from the new level of consumption 
on a by-commodity basis. The new level of per capita expenditure obtained for each survey household is 
then compared to the official poverty line, and standard poverty measures are re-calculated. Thus, the 
poverty measures are consistent with official poverty estimates, while the changes in poverty draw on the 
analyzed across-group consumption patterns, income distributions, and poverty rates. 
The data used to calibrate the base year of the DCGE model used in this study are drawn from a variety of 
sources. The core dataset underlying the DCGE model is a SAM constructed in 2006 using data from the 
national accounts, trade data from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and balance-of-payment 
information from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). National- and state-level data on agricultural 
production, agricultural yield, and market prices come from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
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Development (FMARD). In cases where production data are unavailable for certain crops (e.g., 
horticulture), information is taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations. These agricultural production data are disaggregated across the zones by mapping each of the 
states to the six zones. The DCGE model is therefore consistent with official agricultural production 
levels and yields at the zonal level. Nonagricultural production, employment, and other value-added 
component of national-level sectoral GDP data are compiled from national account tables (NBS 2007a). 
On the demand side, the information on industrial technologies (e.g., intermediate and factor demand) 
comes from an earlier SAM for Nigeria (UNDP 1995b), while the income and expenditure patterns for 
the various household groups are taken from NLSS 2003/04. The DCGE model is therefore based on the 
most recent available data for Nigeria and represents the country’s economy in 2006.5 
3.  POVERTY REDUCTION UNDER NIGERIA'S CURRENT GROWTH PATH  
Design of a Baseline Simulation to Capture Growth Trends 
The dynamic CGE model developed for this study is first used to simulate a base-run that captures 
Nigeria’s current growth and poverty reduction trends, taking into account the recent changes in the 
country’s external environment (e.g., the global financial crisis and the sharp decline in world crude oil 
prices). These external changes are expected to negatively affect the Nigerian economy’s performance in 
the near future, as crude oil accounts for 37 percent of national total GDP. History shows that the 
Nigerian economy is very vulnerable to oil price shocks, which impact the effective exchange rate, 
government expenditures, money supplies, trade, and inflation (Akpan 2009). Given that both the global 
financial crisis and the declines in world crude oil prices are expected to last for some time, the base-run 
simulation considers a modest, targeted economic growth rate that is lower than the 7.6 percent annual 
growth recorded during the period of 2002-07 (CBN 2009). Measured in real terms, although the crude 
oil sector’s GDP grew at only 4.4 percent annually during this period, due to rising world oil prices, the 
sector’s contribution to overall economic growth was mainly channeled through increased oil revenues. 
Given that this factor is unlikely to play a key positive role in stimulating growth in the present and near 
future, and some of its effects may even become negative (e.g., declines in oil revenue may force the 
government to increase the allocation of growth-stimulating funds), the base-run simulation targets a 
modest annual GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent over the next years (2008-17) (Table 1). While this growth 
rate is lower than the recent performance of the Nigerian economy, it is still relatively high considering 
the current external conditions worldwide. Moreover, this growth rate is higher than the historical average 
growth rate if a longer period is considered. For example, the average annual GDP growth rate during the 
period 1995-2007 was 5.5 percent (CBN 2009). 
The base-run also considers relatively modest growth in the agricultural sector. In addition to the 
reasons noted above to explain our growth projection of the general economy, another factor reminds us 
to be cautious when projecting agricultural growth: Although the national account tables show high-level 
growth (6.7 percent) in agricultural GDP between 2002 and 2007, such a rapid growth in agricultural 
GDP is not consistent with individual crop production data obtained from FMA or the market situation 
(e.g., the price situation) for the major food crops in the domestic markets. In terms of the production 
reported by FMA for certain smallholder-produced crops, the average annual growth rate was 5.5 percent 
in 2000-06. Such growth was primarily driven by area expansion, whereas yield increase-driven growth 
was very modest. For example, the FMA data show that the annual yield-growth rates for cassava, 
sorghum, millet, and maize, were 0.9, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.8 percent, respectively, for this period. These four 
major food crops together account for more than 50 percent of agricultural area in Nigeria at present. 
Given this historical perspective, we use a set of more realistic growth rates for each individual crop and 
livestock product, and apply an annual agricultural growth rate of 5.7 percent (similar to that of 2000-07) 
in the baseline scenario.
3
                                                       
3 The NBS is aware of potential problems in agricultural crop GDP calculations during this period, particularly in 2002, as 
shown below:   
Year  Crop production GDP (1990 constant prices in billions of Naira)  Annual growth rate (%) 
1997  87.4   
1998  90.8  3.9 
1999  95.5  5.2 
2000  98.4  3.0 
2001  102.1  3.8 
2002  168.8  65.3 
2003  181.2  7.3 
2004  192.4  6.2 
2005  206.2  7.2 
2006  221.6  7.5 
Source: NBS (2007). 
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Table 1. GDP growth rates in the baseline and CAADP scenarios  
   Share of GDP  Annual growth rate, 2008-17 (%) 
  In 2006  Baseline  CAADP scenario 
Total GDP  19,909   6.5  8.0 
  (billion Naira)     
Agriculture  29.7  5.7  9.5 
       
  Cereals  7.7  5.4  9.5 
   Rice  2.6  5.1  10.2 
   Wheat  0.0  5.0  25.9 
   Maize  2.2  7.3  12.0 
   Sorghum  1.6  4.0  5.7 
   Millet  1.3  4.2  5.7 
  Root crops  9.4  6.0  8.9 
   Cassava  4.4  5.6  8.7 
   Yams  3.9  6.4  9.3 
   Cocoyams  0.2  4.7  6.0 
   Potatoes  0.3  8.8  12.4 
   Sweet potatoes  0.6  4.7  7.0 
  Other food crops  7.6  5.7  8.1 
   Plantains  0.6  3.8  4.9 
   Beans  1.0  5.3  7.6 
   Groundnuts  1.1  5.5  7.7 
   Soybeans  1.1  5.7  8.5 
   Other oilseeds  0.1  4.5  6.3 
   Vegetables  1.8  6.1  8.6 
   Fruits  1.6  6.4  8.7 
  High-value crops  1.5  5.6  17.6 
   Cocoa  0.1  3.9  4.9 
   Coffee  0.2  6.1  8.8 
   Cotton  0.1  5.2  11.2 
   Oil palm  0.5  3.8  5.7 
   Sugar  0.3  7.3  33.1 
   Tobacco  0.1  6.8  10.0 
   Nuts  0.0  5.7  7.9 
   Cashew nuts  0.004  5.7  7.7 
   Rubber  0.2  6.1  6.1 
   Other export crops  0.017  8.5  12.8 
  Livestock  1.9  5.4  6.9 
   Cattle  0.6  5.5  6.4 
   Goats & sheep  0.9  5.1  6.5 
   Poultry  0.4  5.9  8.8 
   Other livestock  0.0  6.1  7.0 
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Table 1. Continued 
   Share of GDP  Annual growth rate, 2008-17 (%) 
  In 2006  Baseline  CAADP scenario 
       
  Other agriculture  1.6  5.8  10.9 
   Forestry  0.5  4.2  5.7 
   Fisheries  1.0  6.5  12.9 
       
Mining  34.6  3.7  3.7 
   Cruel oil  34.5  3.7  3.7 
   Other mining  0.1  3.7  3.7 
       
Manufacturing  6.9  6.7  7.4 
  Beef  0.6  6.2  7.6 
  Goat & sheep meat  2.2  6.0  7.2 
  Poultry meat  0.2  8.2  13.3 
  Eggs  0.03  7.3  10.7 
  Milk  0.01  7.5  9.9 
  Other meats  0.02  5.7  5.9 
  Beverages  0.3  7.3  7.7 
  Other foods  0.4  8.1  8.6 
  Textiles  0.5  7.8  8.3 
  Wood processing  0.3  7.9  8.8 
  Electronic manufacturing  0.9  6.4  5.4 
  Other manufacturing  1.1  6.5  6.0 
  Oil refining  0.3  6.2  6.2 
       
Other industries  4.3  8.5  8.8 
  Construction  1.2  9.2  9.5 
  Utility  3.1  8.2  8.6 
       
Services  24.5  9.6  10.7 
  Road transportation  2.2  14.9  16.3 
  Other transportation  0.1  15.1  16.1 
  Trade  8.3  9.8  11.4 
  Hotels and restaurants  1.2  8.2  9.1 
  Communication  0.8  13.2  14.1 
  Finance and other business services  1.8  13.8  14.4 
  Real estate   2.6  7.5  7.5 
  Education  1.3  5.8  6.5 
  Health  0.6  6.0  6.8 
  Public services  4.6  4.8  5.6 
  Other private services  1.0  7.2  7.4 
Sources: Nigerian SAM and DCGE model results. 
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Factors Determining Growth in the Model 
To model a realistic baseline, it is also important to be aware of the growth sources across sectors and for 
different input factors. In the model, economic growth results from increases in labor supply, land 
expansion, capital accumulation, and productivity changes. We assume that the growth in total labor 
supply is consistent with the projected annual population growth of 3.0 percent.
4
The total zonal-level land expansion for 2009-17 is exogenously determined based on the recent 
trends observed by FMARD (2007). The assumed initial expansion rate of 5.2 percent per year is 
consistent with FMARD data recorded in 2001-06. After 2011, land expansion is assumed to fall to 4.2 
percent, which is still relatively high. The average annual growth rate of land expansion across the 
modeled period is 4.4 percent (Table 2). Due to a lack of information regarding land expansion potential 
at the zonal level, we have to assume a uniform growth rate across the six zones. Given that agricultural 
production activities are modeled at the zonal level, it will be straightforward to adopt different land 
expansion rates once such information is available.  
 Three types of labor are 
distinguished in the model: (i) rural family labor employed in agricultural production only; (ii) unskilled 
labor that can move freely across sectors (i.e., between agricultural and nonagricultural production); and 
(iii) skilled labor employed only in the nonagricultural sector. Taking into account a more rapid growth in 
labor supply to the nonagricultural sector, we assume that the annual growth rate for rural family labor is 
2.0 percent, while the growth rates in unskilled and skilled labor (the two economy-wide labor categories) 
are 3.3 and 3.4 percent, respectively.  
Capital accumulation is an endogenous outcome of savings and investments, which are modeled 
recursively in our model. Investments are financed through private and government savings. Private 
savings are determined by a fixed proportion of total income (an endogenous variable) received by each 
of the 12 representative households, while government savings is the difference between government 
income (an endogenous variable) and total non-investment spending (an exogenous variable). Both 
private and public savings rates are calibrated to the 2006 SAM. Investments are also affected by foreign 
capital flows. Since Nigeria has experienced a trade surplus in recent years, the net foreign capital inflows 
are negative in the model (indicating capital outflow). In the recursive dynamic model, this outflow is an 
exogenous variable whose growth is assumed to decline due to the expected slow growth in oil exports. 
This assumption brings the expectation that more oil revenues will be used to finance domestic 
investments, instead of purchasing foreign bonds or investing in foreign capital markets (as seen in the 
current situation). In the baseline, capital accumulates at 4.6 percent annually in real terms after a 5.0 
percent depreciation (Table 2). 
While the total factor supply grows either exogenously (labor and land) or endogenously 
(capital), its sectoral-level demand is endogenous. Factor demand is determined by competition in the 
factor markets, and by the profitability of each individual sector. The third part of Table 2 shows the 
growth rate in aggregate labor and capital demand for agriculture and nonagriculture. As can be seen in 
the table, the demand for total agricultural labor grows at 2.2 percent annually, while that for the 
nonagricultural sector grows at 3.7 percent annually. The growth rate of total agricultural capital demand 
is higher than that for total nonagricultural capital demand (6.7 percent vs. 4.5 percent, respectively); 
however, since agricultural capital accounts for a very small portion of total capital input, even given 
rapid growth the share of capital in agricultural GDP remains very small (< 5.0 percent of agricultural 
GDP; by comparison, capital accounts for more than 60 percent of nonagricultural GDP, as shown in the 
first part of Table 2). 
   
                                                       
4 Different population growth rates have been estimated for Nigeria. According to NBS (2007) and the National Population 
Commission (2002), the annual growth rate was 2.83 percent during 1991-2005, while Nigeria population census shows an 
annual growth rate of 3.07 percent during 1991-2006. 9 
Table 2. Growth decomposition in the model simulations 
   GDP  AgGDP  NagGDP 
  Baseline  CAADP  Baseline    CAADP  Baseline  CAADP 
Annual output growth rate (%)  6.5  8.0  5.7     9.5  6.8  7.4 
Share in the economy (%)  In GDP    In AgGDP      In NagGDP   
Land  11.0    37.0         
Labor  45.7    59.4      39.9   
Capital  43.3     3.6        60.1    
Contribution to growth (%)  To GDP growth  To AgGDP growth  To NagGDP growth 
  Baseline  CAADP  Baseline    CAADP  Baseline  CAADP 
Land  9.5  9.8  33.3    24.7     
Labor  20.2  16.2  21.2    12.4  21.7  20.1 
Capital  31.6  25.9  5.0    3.3  41.2  38.6 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)  38.7  48.1  40.6     59.6  37.1  41.2 
Annual input and TFP growth rate (%)  Baseline  CAADP           
Land  4.8  5.7           
Labor  3.0  3.0           
Agricultural (ag) labor  2.2  2.1           
Nonagricultural (nag) labor  3.7  3.7           
Capital  4.6  4.7           
Ag capital  6.7  7.1           
Nag capital  4.5  4.6           
TFP  2.5  3.8           
Ag TFP  2.3  5.6           
Nag TFP  2.5  3.0                
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results. 
It is impossible to have sustainable growth without a change in productivity. The model assumes 
that total factor productivity (TFP) grows exogenously at the sectoral level across all six zones. The TFP 
growth rate is drawn from historical data and is based on the yield-growth rate for crop sectors, and on 
sectoral value-added growth in the case of non-crop sectors.  
While productivity growth is a driving force of growth at the sectoral level, growth is also 
affected by demand. If the supply of a specific commodity cannot find enough demand in either the 
domestic or foreign markets, the price for this commodity in the domestic market falls, subsequently 
reducing the factor demanded by the production of this commodity and lowering its growth rate. 
We calculate the contribution of the factors and productivities to overall economic growth, as 
shown in Table 2. The contribution of a given factor to growth depends on its growth rate and share in 
adding value. For the economy as whole, land accounts for 11.0 percent of GDP, while labor and capital 
account for 45.7 and 43.3 percent, respectively. In terms of GDP growth in the baseline scenario, 61.3 
percent of growth is due to factor accumulation, while 38.7 percent comes from TFP growth (Table 2, 
second part). We also examine the contributions to growth in agricultural and nonagricultural GDP. In the 
baseline scenario, almost 60 percent of agricultural growth is due to land expansion, increased labor 
supply, and capital accumulation, whereas productivity increases explain the remaining 40 percent of 
growth. Within the crop sectors, productivity gains come both from yield improvements and more 
efficient allocations of land to the production of higher-return commodities. 10 
Growth at the Subsectoral Level 
While the base-run models overall annual growth in GDP and the agricultural sector at 6.5 and 5.7 
percent, respectively, during 2008-17, the growth rates differ across sectors. Specifically, input allocation 
across sectors differs over time due to differences in sectoral productivity growth and price changes. For 
example, although agricultural GDP grows at 5.7 percent annually, the growth in total cereal value-added 
is 5.4 percent, while those in rice, maize, and Irish potato production are 5.1, 7.3, and 8.8 percent, 
respectively (Table 1). 
Table 1 presents the base-run GDP growth rates for the subsectors included in the model, as well 
as for some subsector groups. All of these growth rates are the endogenous results of the model. The first 
column of the table gives the size of each sector as a share of the total GDP, representing the initial 
structure of the Nigerian economy in 2006. 
Poverty Reduction Outcome in the Baseline Simulation 
The poverty-reduction impact of the modeled economic growth is analyzed using a microsimulation 
module that includes all households sampled in NLSS 2003/04. By taking into account micro-level 
consumption patterns across households, we determine demand changes at the individual-food-
commodity level for each sampled household, by linking such demand with the representative household 
demand for the same commodity in the DCGE model. As discussed in Section 2, the representative 
households are aggregated from the sample households (based on the six zones and by rural/urban 
location). Although such top-down linkages between the DCGE model and the microsimulation module 
do not allow us to capture the distributional effects of growth within each zone’s rural or urban household 
group, we do capture certain differential welfare effects across zones and between rural and urban 
households.  
Before we start the exercise, we assess the impact of growth on poverty reduction using historical 
national-level poverty data available for 1980, 1985, 1992, 1996, and 2004. Because the poverty rate of 
65.6 percent in 1996 was much higher than that in 1992 (42.7 percent), it is difficult to perform a trend 
analysis over a longer period. For this reason, we focus on the poverty rates in the recent period between 
1996 (in which the poverty rate was 65.6 percent) and 2004 (54.4 percent), and compare them with actual 
per capita GDP growth over the same period. While the annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.5 
percent (calculated from the CBN’s annual GDP growth rate of 5.5 percent and the annual population 
growth rate of 3.0 percent during this period), the total decline in the poverty rate was only 11.2 
percentage points over these seven years (or 2.3 percent per year). By comparing the total decline in the 
national poverty rate (i.e. 2004’s poverty rate is 17 percent, not percentage points, lower than that in 
1996) with the total growth in per capita GDP (22 percent) across the same seven years, we derive a 
poverty-reduction-growth elasticity of –0.78.
5
                                                       
5 The poverty–growth elasticity used in this study measures the responsiveness of the poverty rate to changes in the per 
capita GDP growth rate. The formula for this elasticity is: 
 This indicates that for a 1 percent growth in per capita 
GDP in Nigeria between 1996 and 2004, the poverty rate fell by 0.78 percent from the 1996 level. 
Although the elasticity is affected by the initial poverty rate (which was high in 1996) and the pattern of 
income distribution around the poverty income line, such elasticity is comparable with that obtained for 
other African countries (See Diao et al. 2007).  
 , 
where   and are the average annual changes (from the base year) in the poverty headcount rate and the level of per 
capita GDP, respectively, and   and are the base-year poverty headcount rate and per capita GDP, respectively. The 
poverty–growth elasticity measures the percentage change in the poverty headcount rate caused by a 1 percent increase in per 
capita GDP. This is not equivalent to a percentage point change in the poverty headcount rate. 
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We also use the same formula to calculate the poverty-growth elasticity from the results of the 
baseline simulation, and obtain a similar elasticity of -0.851. That is to say, for a 1 percent of growth in 
per capita GDP over the next ten years along the base-run path, the national poverty rate will fall by 0.851 
percent. Given such elasticity, our poverty analysis shows that annual growths of 6.5 percent in total GDP 
and 5.7 percent in agricultural GDP over the next years (2008-17), together with a 3.0 percent annual 
population growth in the same period, will decrease the national poverty rate from 51.6 percent in 2008
6
Figure 1. Poverty rates (%) in the baseline scenario 
 
to 39.4 percent by 2017 (Figure 1). However, although this poverty rate is already lower than that seen in 
1992 (42.7 percent), given the 3.0 percent population growth per year, the number of poor people will 
actually increase over time. The base-run result shows that there will be 287,000 more poor people in 
Nigeria in 2017 versus 2008.   
 
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results. 
The base-run also generates national-level rural and urban poverty rates (Figure 1), as well as 
zonal-level rates for the six regions (Figure 2). The NLSS 2003/04 data show that in 2004, poverty was 
worse in rural areas (63.3 percent) than in urban areas (43.2 percent). These poverty rates are the starting 
points in the model and are used to simulate the poverty rates in 2008 and beyond. As shown in Figure 1, 
given a 6.5 percent annual growth in total GDP and 5.7 percent growth in agricultural GDP, the poverty 
rates fall to 47.9 and 29.4 percent in rural and urban areas, respectively, by 2017. Because the absolute 
percentage-point decline for the rural group is slightly higher than that for the urban group (12 vs. 11 
percentage points, respectively, between 2008 and 2017), the poverty gap between the rural and urban 
regions becomes smaller (20.1 percentage points in 2008 vs. 18.5 percentage points in 2017). 
As discussed in Section 1, the spatial pattern of poverty distribution in Nigeria shows a south-to-
north disparity; in 2004, the three southern regions had poverty rates between 26.7 to 43.0 percent, while 
the northern regions had poverty rates between 67.0 to 72.2 percent. This type of regional gap in poverty 
will continue through the next years. The base-run model results show that the poverty rates in the three 
southern regions will fall between 13.4-30.0 percent by 2017, but will remain high between 51.5 to 55.6 
percent in the three northern regions (Figure 2). 
                                                       
6 The poverty rate in 2008 is also a model result obtained using the same formula defined in footnote 5. 12 
Figure 2. Regional poverty rates (%) in the baseline scenario 
 
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results.  13 
4.  ACCELERATING AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION  
Going Beyond the CAADP Agricultural Growth Target 
In the previous section, we describe the results of the base-run scenario and estimate the poverty-
reduction impact of a growth path that takes into account both Nigeria’s past growth experiences and our 
present external conditions. In this section, we examine the potential contribution of different agricultural 
subsectors toward helping Nigeria achieve a much higher overall rate of agricultural growth.  
The CAADP initiative has set a 6 percent annual agricultural growth rate as a target for African 
countries. Considering that recent agricultural growth in Nigeria has been close to this CAADP target, the 
government has set a higher growth target of 10 percent. To meet the 10 percent target for overall 
agricultural growth, a set of sector-specific growth targets have been defined for the production of major 
crops and livestock (FMARD 2008). Most of these subsectoral-level targets specify the sector’s output; 
growth in productivity (or yield) is only mentioned for cassava. Table 3 summarizes the current levels and 
production targets at the subsectoral level, both obtained from a draft of FMARD (2008). 
Given that there is a large yield gap between the current and maximum levels for most crops 
(Table 4), the potential for agricultural growth in Nigeria is high. However, considering that FMARD 
(2008) addresses only a relatively short period, the targeted growth seems to be unrealistic for most food 
crops. According to a report published by ReSAKSS WA (2009), potential yield predictions are often 
based on growth under the idealized conditions of controlled field trials. Thus, it is unlikely that farmers 
will be able to achieve such yields at the national level over the short period under consideration. It will 
also be difficult to realize nationwide adoption of the improved seeds and modern technologies that are 
needed to reach such high yield potentials. It does not seem that these constraints have been taken into 
account when the production targets were designed. For example, in FMARD (2008), cassava yield and 
production are both targeted to double nationwide over a period of four years (2008-11), for annual 
growth rates of 19.5 percent. When we design a scenario that we call the “CAADP growth scenario,” 
which is based on the targets set in FMARD (2008), we apply such targets to a period from 2009 to 2017, 
giving farmers a longer timeframe to meet similar targets. For example, in the case of cassava, the annual 
growth rate becomes about 8.9 percent in our model. The second part of Table 3 gives the modeled 
growth rates for crop and livestock production, which we set using the government’s targets.  
FMARD (2008) includes production targets for ten crops, five livestock products, and the fishery 
sector. To model the accelerated growth in these crops and livestock production subsectors under the 
CAADP scenario, we assume additional land expansion for some crops (rice, wheat, cocoa, sugar and oil 
palm), while for the other crops, as well as livestock and fisheries, additional growth is assumed to come 
only from productivity improvement (e.g., yield increases in the case of crops). While production targets 
are not available for many of the crops included in the model, a number of these are large subsectors in 
the agricultural economy (e.g., maize, sorghum, yams, pulses and oilseeds); therefore, the simulation also 
assumes additional productivity growth for these crops. 14 
Table 3. Production targets at the subsectoral level 
  Target defined in NFSP  DCGE model results 
  Current 
level  Level by 2011  Total increase  Annual growth  Level by  Total increase  Annual 
growth 
  Million mt  Million mt  %  (08-11, %)  2017  (06-17, %)  (09-17, %) 
Crops               
Cassava  49.0  100.0  104.1  19.5  96.0  115.0  8.9 
Rice  2.8  5.6  100.0  18.9  22.8  142.0  10.3 
Millet  4.0  6.5  62.5  12.9  14.1  64.1  5.7 
Wheat  0.1  0.5  614.3  63.5  0.5  548.7  23.1 
Sugar  0.2  2.2  1034.0  83.5  33.9  1072.5  31.5 
Tomatoes  1.1  2.2  100.0  18.9  11.7  99.6  8.0 
Cotton  0.4  1.0  185.7  30.0  2.1  172.7  11.8 
Cocoa  0.4  0.7  84.2  16.5  0.7  141.4  10.3 
Palm oil  0.8  1.3  50.0  10.7  12.6  74.5  6.4 
Palm kernels  0.4  0.6  50.0  10.7       
Rubber  0.2  0.3  50.0  10.7  0.6  82.9  6.9 
Livestock & fisheries               
Poultry  166.0  249.0  50.0  10.7  182.2  110.1  8.6 
Goats  52.0  67.6  30.0  6.8  391.6  81.9  6.9 
Sheep  33.0  42.9  30.0  6.8       
Cattle  16.0  20.0  25.0  5.7  257.8  78.5  6.6 
Pigs  6.6  8.3  25.0  5.7  28.7  113.3  8.8 
Fisheries  0.5  1.5  200.0  31.6  750.8  189.4  12.5 
Agricultural GDP        10.0 -15.0      9.5 
Sources: FMARD (2008) and Nigerian DCGE model results. 15 






Rice  1.9  7.0 
Cassava  12.3  28.4 
Maize  1.6  4.0 
Sorghum  1.1  3.2 
Millet  1.1  2.4 
Yams  12.3  18.0 
Irish Potatoes  7.6  10.5 
Soybeans  1.2  2.0 
Beniseeds  0.6  1.0 
Melons  0.4  0.5 
Cocoa   0.2  2.0 
Cowpeas  0.5  2.3 
Okra  3.1  5.5 
Sources: The current yields come from FMARD (2007) and NBS (2005a); the potential yields come from ReSAKSS WA (2009).  
Taking maize as an example, data from FMARD (2007) indicates that the current national yield 
level is around 1.4 metric tons per hectare (mt/ha). Under the base-run scenario, we assume that the 
average maize yield for the next years will grow at 0.3 percent annually, which is consistent with the yield 
growth seen in the country during the prior seven years (1999-2006). Given such growth, the maize yield 
level will unlikely to change over the next years, and growth in maize production will be primarily driven 
by area expansion. Under the CAADP scenario, we model a slightly more ambitious maize yield 
improvement, with an annual growth rate of 2.9 percent per year (Table 5). This implies that the national 
average maize yield will reach 1.8 mt/ha by 2017. This is still below the potential yield of 4.0 mt/ha that 
has been achieved in certain experimental projects and farm trials using improved technologies and 
practices (Valencia and Breth 1999). As discussed above, however, the majority of maximum yields are 
achieved under ‘ideal’ conditions in agricultural research stations or on-farm trials. These potential yields 
can only be achieved through access to modern inputs, including the use of improved high-yield seed 
varieties and new technologies, as well as improved farming practices that differ from the traditional 
methods that most farmers presently use (ReSAKSS WA 2009). Because maximum yields require better 
technology, farming knowledge, and market conditions, we deem it unrealistic to assume that such high 
yields will be realized at the national level in the next years. However, even though we project 
conservative crop yields in the CAADP scenario, the annual growth rates required to achieve the target 
yields are already higher than the historical trends (Table 5). Clearly, it will be a daunting task to achieve 
the government’s target yields.  16 
Table 5. Crop yield, area and production and CAADP targets and growth rates (national level) 
   Crop yield   Harvested area   Production quantity 
Initial level  Baseline  Target  CAADP  Initial level  Share  Baseline  CAADP  Initial level  Baseline  CAADP 
   mt/ha  growth %  mt/ha  growth %  1000 ha  %  %  %  1000 mt  %  % 
 Cereals                          
   Rice  1.5  1.1  2.4  5.1  6,214  8.6  4.5  5.0  9,436  5.6  10.3 
   Wheat  1.1  0.1  1.3  1.8  70  0.1  5.5  20.9  80  5.6  23.1 
   Maize  1.4  0.3  1.8  2.9  8,984  12.4  6.8  8.2  12,540  7.1  11.3 
   Sorghum  1.4  0.6  1.7  2.8  8,963  12.4  3.7  2.9  12,208  4.3  5.8 
   Millet  1.5  0.3  1.9  2.6  5,651  7.8  4.0  3.0  8,584  4.2  5.7 
 Root crops                       
   Cassava  13.0  1.1  18.2  3.8  3,428  4.7  4.9  4.9  44,630  6.1  8.9 
   Yams  8.3  1.2  11.2  3.4  4,206  5.8  5.5  5.8  34,726  6.7  9.4 
   Cocoyams  0.6  2.5  0.8  3.4  5,027  7.0  4.2  4.7  3,047  6.8  8.2 
   Potatoes  8.9  5.7  18.8  8.7  226  0.3  2.6  2.7  2,003  8.5  11.6 
   Sweet     
     
3.4  0.7  4.3  2.7  1,128  1.6  4.4  4.3  3,832  5.2  7.2 
Other food crops                       
   Plantains  6.9  2.0  9.7  3.7  440  0.6  2.5  1.6  3,055  4.5  5.4 
   Beans  0.5  1.5  0.7  3.4  10,259  14.2  4.0  4.0  5,328  5.6  7.5 
   Groundnuts  1.2  1.3  1.6  3.6  3,665  5.1  4.3  4.0  4,258  5.7  7.7 
   Soybeans  0.7  1.2  0.9  3.4  2,739  3.8  4.5  4.9  1,834  5.7  8.5 
   Other oilseeds  1.8  0.9  2.2  2.1  77  0.1  4.3  4.7  141  5.3  6.9 
   Vegetables  7.6  1.2  10.0  3.0  770  1.1  4.6  4.9  5,873  5.9  8.0 
   Fruits  5.2  1.6  6.8  3.2  1,482  2.1  4.5  5.0  7,634  6.2  8.3 
 High-value crops                       
   Cocoa  0.3  5.3  0.5  6.5  1,050  1.5  3.0  3.6  277  8.4  10.3 
   Coffee  0.5  1.7  0.6  3.2  566  0.8  4.6  5.4  267  6.3  8.8 
   Cotton  0.8  0.4  0.9  1.5  1,016  1.4  5.8  10.0  778  6.2  11.7 
   Oil palm  1.4  2.5  2.0  4.1  5,167  7.2  1.8  2.2  7,194  4.4  6.4 
   Sugar  19.2  1.4  30.0  5.1  151  0.2  6.0  25.1  2,893  7.5  31.5 
   Tobacco  8.7  1.9  11.8  3.4  4  0.0  5.1  6.4  33  7.0  10.1 
   Nuts  0.8  1.3  1.0  2.7  142  0.2  5.0  5.5  107  6.4  8.4 
   Cashew nuts  4.2  2.0  5.5  3.1  6  0.0  5.2  5.5  25  7.4  8.8 
   Rubber  0.6  -0.1  0.6  0.4  500  0.7  6.9  6.6  305  6.8  6.9 
   Other crops  0.5  1.8  0.7  3.3  252  0.3  6.9  9.3  134  8.8  12.9 
Sources: The current yields come from FMARD (2007) and NBS (2005a). The targeted yields, area, and production data are based on a literature review of various Nigerian 
government documents in which different crop targets are. The growth rates are the results from the model.  17 
In order to assess the contribution of each agricultural product/subsector to the realization of the 
10 percent goal for national growth in overall agriculture and the poverty reduction goal of MDG1, we 
use a series of scenarios in which the growth rates in specific crops or groups of crops/livestock products 
are simulated individually, while the growth rates in the remaining crops/subsectors maintain their base-
run levels. Table 6 summarizes these scenarios, most of which are based on targets that have recently 
been set by the government for specific commodities and subsectors. For commodities that do not have 
available target information (e.g., plantains), we use what we believe to be a reasonable growth rate, 
which is mainly based on the potential market demand driven by household income growth, and is set 
such that the prices for these commodities will not rise unrealistically.  
In each scenario listed in Table 6, additional growth in productivity (or yield) is assumed to occur 
only in the targeted crop(s) or subsector, while productivity growth for the non-targeted crops or 
subsectors is assumed to be the same as that in the base-run. For example, in the maize-led growth 
scenario, additional productivity growth in maize is exogenously assumed such that the level of maize 
yield will reach the targeted level by 2017. On the other hand, there is no additional productivity growth 
for any other crop or non-crop subsector, and the productivity growths for all non-maize crops are the 
same as those in the base-run.  
While productivity growth in an agricultural subsector can be assumed exogenously, this does not 
imply that there is no growth impact on any other subsector for which additional productivity growth is 
exogenously assumed. Growth in other sectors may occur through the linkage effects captured in the 
general equilibrium model. These effects include the competition (and hence reallocation) of 
factors/inputs across subsectors, changes in relative prices, and differential changes in domestic market 
demand or international trade across sectors that are experiencing increased incomes. Because of the 
complex general equilibrium linkages, growth in subsectors other than the targeted subsector can be 
affected positively or negatively. For example, if an increased maize supply can easily find demand in the 
market (domestically or internationally) and maize prices do not fall significantly, then maize production 
will compete with other crops for additional resources (land or labor) and intermediate inputs (fertilizer 
and so on); therefore, the growth rates of some other crops (e.g., sorghum or millet) could be negatively 
affected. On the other hand, if there are demand constraints in the market (e.g., due to a weak income 
elasticity of demand, or a lack of export- or import-substitution opportunities), domestic maize prices will 
fall. In the latter case, even if the maize yield rises, the maize output may increase by less than the yield 
growth, and resources (land, labor and other inputs) will be released from maize production to potentially 
increase the production of other crops. These complex linkage effects imply that although yield or 
production targets can be set individually for a specific crop or subsector on the supply side, target 
realization will be jointly determined by both the supply and the market demand. Therefore, policies 
affecting demand (including market development and access) are equally important for meeting CAADP 
goals in agricultural growth.  
We first focus on the overall simulation results for the comprehensive CAADP scenario regarding 
the economy as a whole. According to the model, if the growth rates set for the individual crops and 
agricultural subsectors can be achieved in the next years, the Nigerian agricultural GDP will grow at 9.5 
percent annually in this period, more than 4 percentage points higher than the base-run growth (Table 1). 
Through economy-wide effects, additional growth will also occur in nonagricultural subsectors that have 
close linkages with the agricultural sector. As shown in Table 2, accelerated agricultural growth is mainly 
driven by productivity under this scenario. Total factor productivity (TFP) in the agricultural sector grows 
at 5.6 percent annually, instead of the 2.3 percent seen in the baseline. The contribution of TFP to 
agricultural GDP growth therefore rises to 59.6 percent (from 40.6 percent in the baseline). While rapid 
productivity growth attracts more capital into the agricultural sector (capital demand in the agricultural 
sector grows at 7.1 percent annually in this scenario, compared to 6.7 percent in the baseline), labor 
employment in the agricultural sector is similar (the agricultural labor growth rate slightly falls from 2.2 
percent annually in the baseline to 2.1 percent in this scenario). Productivity-led agricultural growth also 
benefits growth in the nonagricultural sector, as TFP annual growth in the nonagricultural sector rises 
from 2.5 percent in the baseline to 3.0 percent under the CAADP scenario. The pace of capital 18 
accumulation also rises, allowing total capital (and hence capital employed in the nonagricultural sector) 
to grow more rapidly than we see in the baseline. 
Table 6. Model growth scenarios 
  Model name 














































































































   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
Rice  ×        ×                × 
Wheat    ×      ×                × 
Maize      ×    ×                × 
Sorghum        x  ×                × 
Millet        x  ×                × 
Cassava            ×  ×            × 
Yams              ×            × 
Cocoyams              ×            × 
Potatoes              ×            × 
Sweet potatoes              ×            × 
Plantains                          × 
Beans                ×          × 
Groundnuts                ×          × 
Soybeans                ×          × 
Other oilseeds                ×          × 
Vegetables, domestic                          × 
Vegetables, export                  ×        × 
Fruits, domestic                          × 
Fruits, export                  ×        × 
Cocoa                  ×        × 
Coffee                  ×        × 
Cotton                  ×        × 
Oil palm                  ×        × 
Sugar                  ×        × 
Tobacco                  ×        × 
Nuts                  ×        × 
Cashew nuts                  ×        × 
Rubber                  ×        × 
Other export crops                  ×        × 
Cattle                    ×      × 
Goats & sheep                    ×      × 
Poultry                    ×      × 
Other livestock                    ×      × 
Fisheries                      ×    × 
Forestry                        ×  × 
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Sector-level growth is further examined in Table 1, which gives a detailed list of the agricultural 
subsectors and agriculture-related food processing sectors (beef, goat and sheet meat, poultry meat, eggs, 
milk, other meats, beverages, other foods), and non-food agriculture-related sectors (textile and wood 
processing). The economy-wide impact of CAADP growth (both directly and indirectly) increases the 
annual growth rate of total GDP from 6.5 percent in the base-run to 8.0 percent in the CAADP scenario. 
More than 75 percent of this GDP growth is the direct outcome of accelerated agricultural growth, while 
the other 25 percent comes from increases in nonagricultural-sector growth via linkage effects. 
Subsectoral-Level Contributions to Accelerated Agricultural Growth 
Table 7 reports the contribution of each agricultural subsector toward reaching the 10 percent agricultural 
GDP growth goal (far right column). For this analysis, we first divide the agricultural subsectors into six 
groups: cereals, root crops, other food crops, high-value crops, livestock, and other agriculture. Each 
subsector’s contribution to overall agricultural growth is determined by: (i) its size in the economy, as 
measured by its share of agricultural GDP; (ii) its baseline growth trend; and (iii) its possible additional 
growth in the future. All of these factors are reported in the table. The first column gives the share of each 
subsector in total agricultural GDP; these shares are calculated from the new Nigerian SAM developed 
for this study and represent the situation in 2006. The second column shows the annual growth rates in the 
base-run, and represents the same baseline information found in Table 1. The third column shows the 
rates of additional annual growth under the CAADP scenario (i.e., the difference between the baseline and 
CAADP growth rates in Table 1). In other words, the sum of the values in the second and third columns 
gives us the average annual growth rate for each sector under the CAADP scenario. The far-right column 
gives each subsector’s contribution to additional growth in overall agricultural GDP under the CAADP 
scenario; this contribution is roughly equal to the product of the first and third columns normalized by the 
additional growth in overall agricultural GDP. 
The results presented in Table 7 show that accelerated growth in cereal crop production, 
particularly in rice, contributes most to overall agricultural growth under the CAADP scenario. Cereal 
crop production as a whole contributes 30.9 percent of accelerated agricultural growth under the CAADP 
scenario, while rice alone contributes 14.5 percent. This is expected given that cereal crops are the second 
most important agricultural subsector in the Nigerian economy (after root crops, which accounted for 25.9 
percent of initial agricultural GDP in 2006), and have the highest growth targets in FMARD (2008). In 
terms of the targeted growth rates, in order to reach the targeted level of rice production by 2017, annual 
growth must increase by almost 10 percent between 2009 and 2017. Among the five cereal crops included 
in the model, wheat has the highest required growth rate under the CAADP scenario, due to the wheat 
self-sufficiency target set in FMARD (2008). To meet such an ambitious target, wheat is modeled to grow 
at 26 percent each year over the next years. However, because this sector holds a relatively small share in 
total agriculture, its growth contribution is the smallest among the cereals (0.8 percent in total) even given 
this extremely rapid growth. 
Although the root crops represent the largest subsector in agriculture, currently composing 31.6 
percent of agricultural GDP, root crops have the second most important contribution to agricultural 
growth (after cereals). Among the five root crops included in the model, only cassava is subject to a 
national target in FMARD (2008). We assume modest additional growth in the other four roots and tubers 
contained within the subsector. However, because their growth is relatively low compared to that in most 
of the cereal crops, the root crops as a whole only experience 2.9 percent additional annual growth in this 
scenario, and the subsector contributes 29.1 percent of agricultural growth. Given its large size in the 
agricultural economy, however, cassava is still the second most important contributor to growth, 
accounting for 14.1 percent of accelerated agricultural growth. Yams ranks third, with a contribution of 
12.2 percent.  
Given the diversity in the diets and agricultural food production strategies in Nigeria, many other 
food crops are important for both food security and poverty reduction. We group them into the “other 
food crops” group. This group accounts for 25.7 percent of agricultural GDP, making it the third largest 20 
subsector after roots and cereals. Consistent with this ranking, the other-food-crops group is the third 
most important contributor, with 18.4 percent of accelerated growth in agriculture being explained by 
growth in this subsector. 
Table 7. Subsectoral-level contributions to agricultural CAADP growth  
   Share in  Base growth  Additional growth  Contribution to AgGDP 
   AgGDP (%)  rate (%)  in CAADP (%)  growth (%) 
  Cereals  25.9  5.4  4.1  30.9 
   Rice  8.9  5.1  5.2  14.5 
   Wheat  0.1  5.0  20.9  0.8 
   Maize  7.3  7.3  4.7  10.8 
   Sorghum  5.4  4.0  1.7  2.8 
   Millet  4.2  4.2  1.5  2.0 
  Root crops  31.6  6.0  2.9  29.1 
   Cassava  14.7  5.6  3.1  14.1 
   Yams  13.2  6.4  2.9  12.2 
   Cocoyams  0.7  4.7  1.3  0.3 
   Potatoes  1.0  8.8  3.6  1.1 
   Sweet   
     
1.9  4.7  2.2  1.4 
  Other food crops  25.7  5.7  2.4  18.4 
   Plantains  2.1  3.8  1.2  0.8 
   Beans  3.4  5.3  2.3  2.5 
   Groundnuts  3.6  5.5  2.2  2.5 
   Soybeans  3.8  5.7  2.9  3.4 
   Other oilseeds  0.4  4.5  1.8  0.2 
   Vegetables  6.2  6.1  2.5  4.9 
   Fruits  5.5  6.4  2.4  4.1 
  High-value crops  4.9  5.6  12.0  10.9 
   Cocoa  0.3  3.9  0.9  0.1 
   Coffee  0.5  6.1  2.7  0.5 
   Cotton  0.3  5.2  6.0  0.5 
   Oil palm  1.5  3.8  1.9  0.9 
   Sugar  1.02  7.3  25.8  8.3 
   Tobacco  0.49  6.8  3.2  0.5 
   Nuts  0.1  5.7  2.2  0.1 
   Cashew nuts  0.01  5.7  1.9  0.0 
   Rubber  0.5  6.1  0.0  0.0 
   Other export   
     
0.1  8.5  4.4  0.1 
  Livestock  6.5  5.4  1.4  2.8 
   Cattle  2.1  5.5  0.6  0.4 
   Goats &  
     
3.1  5.1  1.4  1.3 
   Poultry  1.2  5.9  2.8  1.1 
   Other  
     
0.2  6.1  0.9  0.0 
  Other agriculture  5.3  5.8  5.1  7.9 
   Forestry  1.8  4.2  1.5  0.9 
   Fisheries  3.5  6.5  6.4  7.0 
Sources: Nigerian SAM and DCGE model results. 
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Ten high-value crops are included in the model: cocoa, coffee, cotton, oil palm, sugar, tobacco, 
nuts, cashew nuts, rubber, and other export crops. Most of these crops are export-oriented; either they are 
currently important export crops or they have historically been important export crops. The ten crops 
together account for 4.9 percent of agricultural GDP, making this the smallest agricultural subsector in the 
economy. High growth is assumed for these crops, driven by the extremely high growth in sugar required 
to meet the target set in FMARD (2008). As a group, the additional annual growth rate under the CAADP 
scenario is 12 percent, increasing from a base-run level of 5.6 percent to 17.6 percent under the CAADP 
scenario. However, given the relatively small share of these crops in the country’s agricultural economy, 
their contribution to accelerated agricultural growth (10.9 percent), which primarily comes from a greater 
than 30 percent annual growth in sugar production, is less important than the contributions of the food 
crop subsectors.    
Currently, primary livestock production accounts for 6.5 percent of agricultural GDP. Targets for 
most livestock products are set in FMARD (2008). Consistent with these targets, we model a rapid 
growth in poultry production, which rises from 5.9 percent per year in the base-run to 8.7 percent under 
the CAADP scenario. However, the targets set for cattle and goat/sheep products are quite modest, 
yielding annual growth rates of 6.1 and 6.5 percent, respectively. Because of the modest growth in most 
non-poultry livestock products, livestock in total contributes only 2.8 percent of agricultural growth.  
As FMARD (2008) gives fisheries a high output target, our CAADP scenario models a rapid 
growth in fisheries, at 12.9 percent annually. Fisheries currently account for 3.5 percent of agricultural 
GDP; given such growth, this subsector contributes 7 percent of the accelerated agricultural growth seen 
in the simulation. Forestry is the smallest subsector broadly defined within agriculture. Given modest 
growth, this subsector contributes less than 1 percent of total agricultural growth under the CAADP 
scenario. 
Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Poverty Reduction 
The joint effect of the 9.5 percent annual agricultural growth modeled in the CAADP scenario and the 
spillover effects into nonagriculture cause poverty to decline by 20.8 percentage points by 2017, putting 
the poverty rate 8.9 percentage points lower than that in the base-run. As shown in Figure 3, the 
proportion of Nigeria’s population living below the poverty line will fall to 30.8 percent by 2017 in this 
scenario, compared with the baseline scenario’s 39.7 percent. Greater poverty reduction occurs in rural 
areas; the rural poverty rate declines by 23.3 percentage points from 2008 to 2017, to a level that is more 
than 10.6 percentage points lower than that obtained in the base-run. In urban areas, the poverty rate 
declines by 17.7 percentage points between 2008 and 2017, to a level that is 6.8 percentage points lower 
than that obtained in the base-run. If the 1996 national poverty rate of 65.6 percent is chosen as the rate 
targeted by MDG1, our results show that this poverty rate will be halved by 2017. Indeed, it will be 
reduced to 35.5 percent in 2015, and to 30.8 percent by 2017. The rural poverty rate was 69.8 percent in 
1996. Although poverty reduction has a higher rate in rural versus urban areas, the rural poverty rate 
under the CAADP scenario will still be as high as 37.3 percent by 2017, and therefore will not reach 
MDG1. On the other hand, the poverty rate in urban areas will fall to 26.2 percent in 2015 and 22.6 
percent by 2017, declining more than 50 percent from its 1996 level. Thus, although high agricultural 
growth will reduce the poverty gap between rural and urban areas from 20.1 percentage points in 2004 to 
14.7 percentage points by 2017, the country must seek to reduce rural poverty more rapidly over the next 
years.  
Achieving the high growth target in agriculture will lift an additional 16.5 million people above 
the poverty line by 2017, reversing the base-run’s trend of an increasing number of poor. Even with an 
annual population growth of 3.0 percent, the absolute number of poor will fall to 59.7 million by 2017, as 
compared to the current level of 77 million and the base-run’s 2017 projected level of 78.7 million. Food 
security will also improve, with an additional 140 kg of cereals and 300 kg of root products available per 22 
year for each Nigerian citizen by 2017, compared with their current per capita levels.
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Figure 3. National poverty rates (%) under alternative agricultural growth scenarios 
 Furthermore, 
although Nigeria will continue to import some cereal products (e.g., wheat and rice), the ratio of imports 
in domestic consumption will be substantially lower under the CAADP scenario compared to the base-
run. 
 
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results. 
Faster agricultural growth benefits the majority of households, but not all households will benefit 
equally from achieving the crop and livestock growth targets set under the CAADP scenario. For this 
reason, we also investigate the poverty impacts at the zonal level for the six regions. The results are 
reported in Table 8; the first two columns show the poverty rates in 1996 and 2004 (drawn from NLSS for 
these two years), while the third and forth columns report the 2017 poverty rates projected under the base-
run and CAADP growth scenarios. To facilitate comparison across regions, the last four columns report 
the reduction in poverty rates as percentage points and percent-change due to accelerated agricultural 
growth under the CAADP scenario, both compared with the 1996 and base-run 2017 values. We also 
include the national poverty rates for the country as a whole and for the rural and urban areas separately 
in the first part of the table (rows 1-3). As seen in Table 8 and discussed above, there is significant spatial 
disparity in the distribution of poverty across Nigeria. Although this regional disparity was less significant 
in 1996, NLSS (2003/04) indicates that the three northern regions had higher poverty rates than the three 
southern regions during the latter census (Table 8, second and third columns). The regional disparity in 
poverty distribution does not change under the base-run and CAADP growth scenarios. For example, the 
highest regional poverty rate in 2004 was found in the Northeast region (72.2 percent). This situation is 
projected to continue until 2017 in both the base-run and CAADP growth scenarios. The spatial poverty 
gap, which represents the difference between the highest regional poverty rate (that in the Northeast) and 
the lowest poverty rate (that in the Southeast) was 45.5 percentage points in 2004. By 2017, the poverty 
gap is smaller in both the base-run and CAADP scenarios, but remains high at 43.8 and 35.2 percentage 
points, respectively. It is reasonable to believe that accelerated and high agricultural growth in the 
southern regions will allow them to achieve MDG1 of halving the 1996 poverty rate by 2015. However, 
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processing and livestock production. 23 
MDG1 is far from being achieved in the three northern regions, where the 2017 poverty rate will still be 
as high as 42.2 to 43.7 percent.  
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National  65.6  54.4  39.7  30.8  -34.8  -8.9  -53.0  -22.4 
                 
Rural  69.8  63.3  47.9  37.3  -32.5  -10.6  -46.6  -22.1 
Urban  58.2  43.2  29.4  22.6  -35.6  -6.8  -61.1  -23.1 
                 
Southsouth  58.2  35.1  21.5  14.0  -44.2  -7.4  -75.9  -34.6 
Southeast  53.5  26.7  13.4  8.5  -45.0  -4.9  -84.1  -36.5 
Southwest  60.9  43.0  30.0  24.7  -36.2  -5.3  -59.4  -17.6 
North central  64.7  67.0  51.5  41.9  -22.8  -9.6  -35.2  -18.7 
Northeast  70.1  72.2  55.6  42.2  -27.9  -13.4  -39.8  -24.1 
Northwest  77.2  71.2  55.4  43.7  -33.5  -11.7  -43.4  -21.1 
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results.  
Notably, due to the absence of growth targets at the state or regional level under the CAADP 
development framework, we have to assume a uniform target for each individual crop or livestock 
product across the six regions. Obviously, the initial conditions and growth potentials are very different 
between the north and south. Analysis of the NLSS (2003/04) data shows that the initial production 
conditions (e.g., access to fertilizer and other growth opportunities) are much worse in the north than in 
the south.
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Growth Multipliers and Contributions of Subsectoral growth to Poverty Reduction 
 If special attention is not paid to the northern regions in terms of public investment, modern 
input access, and other input/output market developments, the growth opportunities in Nigeria may 
further be biased towards the south. Unless such efforts are prioritized by the government, poverty 
reduction goals will be more difficult to achieve in the north, where the current poverty rate is already 
higher than in other parts of the country. 
The previous section highlights the potential contributions of different crops and subsectors toward 
increasing agricultural growth and poverty reduction. However, in order for the country to design pro-
poor growth strategies, we must understand the magnitude of poverty reductions led by the growth of 
specific sectors in the economy. In this subsection, we further analyze these linkages by calculating 
poverty-growth elasticities that focus on the pro-poorness of growth, and growth multipliers that allow 
comparison of the spillover effects of growth in various subsectors. These elasticities and multipliers are 
endogenous outcomes from our model results. The poverty-growth elasticity is affected by household-
level growth, since growth affects individual households differently due to heterogeneities among income 
sources and consumption patterns. Due to data constraints, we cannot capture differential income 
structures at the individual household level, nor can we analyze the poverty impacts of such income 
structures under different growth options. Moreover, the DCGE model groups the households into 12 
representative household groups defined by six zones and rural/urban location, and changes in either 
incomes or consumption occur endogenously only among these 12 household groups. In the absence of 
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further household disaggregation by other social and economic indicators (e.g., by source of income, type 
of farm, gender of household head, and so on), the model is unable to take into account many household 
characteristics that are important to explaining growth and poverty relationships. Keeping these caveats in 
mind, the poverty-growth elasticities described herein should be seen as a first effort to link growth at the 
agricultural-subsectoral level with poverty reduction at the national and regional levels within an 
economy-wide framework.   
As briefly mentioned above, the poverty-growth elasticity measures the responsiveness of the 
poverty rate to changes in per capita GDP growth. More specifically, the elasticity measures the 
percentage change in the poverty rate caused by a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita. The second 
column of Table 9 shows the poverty-growth elasticities calculated under the different growth scenarios. 
For example, the value of -0.928 in the first column indicates that for a 1 percent increase in annual per 
capita GDP growth led by growth in rice production, the national poverty rate falls by 0.928 percent (not 
percentage points) per year.   
Table 9. Poverty-growth elasticities and growth multipliers 
    Growth multipliers 
 
Poverty-growth elasticity 
(Change in poverty rate/ 







Baseline  -0.851     
Growth is:       
Rice-led  -0.928  1.033  1.036 
Wheat-led  -0.853  1.013  1.037 
Maize-led  -0.914  1.282  1.146 
Millet/sorghum-led  -0.915  3.642  2.786 
Cereal-led  -1.024  1.305  1.184 
Cassava-led  -0.893  1.286  1.120 
Root-led  -0.923  1.246  1.088 
Pulse-led  -0.892  1.857  1.518 
Export-led  -0.814  0.700  0.974 
Livestock-led  -0.858     
Fishery-led  -0.896  1.084  1.027 
Forestry-led  -0.861     
CAADP  -1.144     
Nonagr-led  -0.730  1.012   
Source: Calculated from the Nigerian DCGE model results. 
Notes: The growth multiplier is measured as the number of units of increased real GDP or AgGDP occurring due to a one-unit 
increase in the output (measured as real terms of value-added) of a specific agricultural subsector.  
‘Nonagr’ refers to nonagricultural. 
As seen in the first column, the values of the poverty-reduction elasticities from growth led by 
different agricultural subsectors are all greater than the base-run elasticity of -0.851, with the exception of 
growth led by export crops. This confirms that growth in agriculture, particularly in staples, is indeed pro-
poor. Comparison of growth led by different agricultural subsectors shows that economy-wide growth 
driven by growth in cereals is more effective at reducing poverty than growth in the other crop and 
livestock subsectors. For example, a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita led by increases in cereal 
production causes the national poverty rate to decline by an additional 1.024 percent from its base-run 
level. The second highest poverty reduction elasticity is that for root-crop-led growth, which has an 
elasticity of -0.923 percent.  
Notably, the model results show that the poverty-growth elasticities significantly increase under 
the CAADP scenario, rising to -1.144 percent. This indicates that there is a strong synergy effect in 25 
poverty reduction across growth in different agricultural subsectors. For comparison purposes, we also 
report the poverty-reduction-growth elasticities for overall growth led by growth in the nonagricultural 
sector (Table 9, bottom). This elasticity is much lower at -0.73 percent. Our results therefore indicate that 
for the same level of economic growth measured by total GDP, the poverty reduction effect can be 57 
percent higher if such growth is led by the agricultural versus nonagricultural sector. This finding has a 
strong implication for the future design of Nigeria’s development strategy and the allocation of public 
funding to finance its implementation. If public investment requirements are proportional to GDP growth 
and do not vary by sector, then a nonagriculture-led growth strategy allowing the country to meet with 
MDG1 would be around 50-60 percent more expensive than an agriculture-led growth strategy. In other 
words, nonagricultural spending would have to be 50-60 percent more effective than agricultural spending 
for the two strategies to have equivalent financing requirements. However, there is no evidence 
suggesting that nonagricultural spending is more effective than agricultural spending. Indeed, the opposite 
seems to be true: Public agricultural spending seems to be much more effective at achieving growth, as 
well as being more pro-poor. The public spending required to support an effective agriculture-led 
development strategy is analyzed further in the next section of this paper.  
The growth multiplier is the other important indicator we use to measure the differential 
contribution of subsectoral-level agricultural growth to economy-wide growth. We omit the multiplier 
results for livestock and forestry-led growth because the scenarios assume that there is additional 
productivity growth in the relevant processing sectors. For example, the livestock-led growth scenario 
includes additional productivity growth in meat and milk processing, while the forestry-led growth 
scenario considers wood processing growth. Because these scenarios assume additional productivity 
growth in the relevant nonagricultural subsectors, it is difficult to compare their growth with those led by 
the crop subsectors and fisheries. 
Among the three crop groups, the highest growth multiplier is seen for pulse-led growth. This is 
true for multipliers measured by gains in both total GDP and agricultural GDP. The results indicate that a 
one-unit (not percentage, meaning that we can read it as 1 million Naira) increase in pulse production (in 
terms of real value-added) results in a gain of 1.857 units (1.857 million Naira) for the overall economy, 
or 1.518 units for agricultural GDP, measured in real terms (Table 9). In addition to the increased pulse 
output, an additional 0.518 million Naira of agricultural GDP and 0.340 million Naira of nonagricultural 
GDP are generated through growth in pulse production. Such a high multiplier indicates that there are 
strong linkages between pulse production and other economic activities. In the root crop group, cassava 
also has a high growth multiplier; a 1 million Naira increase in cassava production adds 1.246 million 
Naira to GDP and 1.088 million Naira to agricultural GDP. 
At the individual-crop level, millet and sorghum have the strongest multiplier effects. A 1 million 
Naira increase in the output (value-added) of millet and sorghum generates an additional 1.79 million 
Naira in agricultural GDP and 0.85 million Naira in nonagricultural GDP, all in the real terms. The 
linkages on the supply side come from increased demand in intermediate inputs (backward linkages), the 
provision of more low-cost inputs to other agricultural/food processing subsectors (forward linkages), and 
the release of resources (e.g., land and labor) for the production of other crops (factor mobility linkages). 
In a large developing economy such as that of Nigeria, strong demand-side linkages come through 
increased demand for other agricultural and nonagricultural commodities; this occurs due to the increases 
in farmers’ incomes that come from additional growth in the production of some agricultural subsectors. 
However, millet and sorghum have the highest growth multipliers due to factor mobility linkage effects. 
Millet and sorghum are income-inelastic commodities, meaning that households at higher income levels 
spend less of their incomes to consume additional millet and sorghum, instead preferring to allocate more 
income to the consumption of other foods (e.g., rice, wheat or livestock products). Growth in the supply 
of millet and sorghum due to increased productivity is not necessarily the same as yield growth, as less 
land and labor are needed to produce these crops when their yields increase. When fewer resources are 
used to produce millet and sorghum without lowering their supply levels, i.e., when some of the land and 
labor used for millet and sorghum production can be reallocated to the production of other crops (e.g., 26 
rice, maize and wheat), a strong growth multiplier is seen. Thus, the model results seem to indicate that 
too many resources (primarily land) are allocated to the production of millet and sorghum when the 
productivities of these two crops are low. However, when these two crops become more productive, many 
other agricultural subsectors and the economy as whole benefit through the strong multiplier effects of 
these two crops.  
As noted above, the value of the growth multiplier measured by gains in GDP for export crop-led 
growth is less than 1. As shown in Table 9, the increases in GDP and agricultural GDP are 0.700 and 
0.974 units, respectively, with a unit of increase in export crop production. A growth multiplier < 1 
indicates that, at the given level of resources, growth in other sectors is negatively affected by growth in 
the targeted subsector (in this case, export crops).
9
Price Effects of Accelerated Agricultural Growth 
 This is because domestic prices for export-oriented 
commodities are mainly determined by the international market. Given this price advantage, export-
oriented sectors will compete with other sectors for resources (land, labor, capital, and other inputs). At a 
given resource level, competition will affect factor prices, making it difficult for many other sectors to 
increase their production levels. Similarly, as fewer resources are allocated, production falls in other 
sectors. This finding has important policy implications: Although the development of export-oriented 
agricultural production is often a governmental priority, our results indicate that this growth will have 
weak linkages with the domestic economy in the absence of additional resources (land and labor), or if 
export-oriented production cannot create domestic demand for such products (either through the 
development of agro-processing or through consumer demand). In addition, focusing on export-oriented 
crops may also negatively affect growth outside export-oriented production, decreasing the economy-
wide gains from such a strategy. 
Even if productivity-led agricultural growth benefits a majority of households in both rural and urban 
areas, the negative price effects due to such growth can hurt some farmers. For those farmers who are 
unable to adopt high-yield technologies, still use traditional farming practices, and still produce the same 
amount of product, lowered output prices due to increased production from more productive farmers will 
cause revenues to fall. On the other hand, for those farmers who have adopted the high-yield technology 
but are facing increased input prices (e.g., higher fertilizer prices), lowered output prices together with 
higher input prices might decrease profits despite the use of modern technology. Thus, it is necessary to 
assess the possible price effects from accelerated agricultural growth under the CAADP scenario.  
Figure 4 shows the price trends for selected agricultural products under the CAADP scenario. 
When agricultural production increases, most of the increased product enters domestic markets and the 
consumer price index (CPI) falls over time. As shown in the figure, the model results indicate that CPI is 
about 20 percent lower in 2017 than in 2008. In the same figure, the prices for individual agricultural 
commodities are normalized by CPI, which gives us a change in each individual commodity’s price 
relative to CPI, and represents the overall price level. For example, if the figure shows an up-sloping 
(down-sloping) trend for a specific commodity (e.g. rice or maize), this means that the real price for rice 
or maize rises (falls) relative to CPI. In most cases, the price change is highly related to the magnitude of 
production growth for the given product. Maize, sugar, poultry and fish have annual growth rates between 
9 and 32 percent, and the prices for these products fall the most. In contrast, the price for rice, an import-
substitutable crop with an annual growth rate of 10.3 percent in the CAADP simulation, actually rises 
over time relative to CPI. Similarly, the prices (relative to CPI) increase for the export crops (cocoa and 
cotton), which also have annual growth rates higher than 10 percent in the simulation.  
The price trends are further affected by the market demand for different commodities. If a 
commodity has a high income elasticity, can be substituted by imports, or can be increasingly exported, 
                                                       
9 In this study, we assume the same amount of additional labor and land is available under all scenarios. In other words, we 
compare growth multipliers from growth led by different agricultural subsectors, but assume similar amounts of land and labor 
supply across all of the scenarios. This estimated growth multiplier is much smaller than it would be in the absence of resource 
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its price will not be as strongly affected by increased supply. The high income elasticity implies that a 
consumer experiencing increased income due to growth (in both agricultural and nonagricultural 
activities) will prefer to allocate more of that income to the consumption of such commodities. The 
income elasticity for primary agricultural goods is relatively high only in countries with average per 
capita incomes that are just barely sufficient to meet basic needs. However, in the case of Nigeria, where 
the average per capita income is higher than $1,000, most primary agricultural products are unlikely to 
have high income elasticities. Although the income elasticities for foods typically consumed by the poor 
in rural and urban areas are higher than those for the country as whole, such elasticities are unlikely to 
become the driving force in determining market demand given the country’s current income distribution.  
Figure 4. Levels of selected agricultural prices in the CAADP scenario 
  
Source: Nigerian DCGE model results. 
Note: Normalized by prices in 2008 and deflated by CPI.  
In addition to import substitution (such as seen in the cases of rice and wheat), other agricultural 
market opportunities exist in the potential development of agro-processing industries and expansion of the 
export market. While Nigeria has the largest agro-processing industry in West Africa, the addition of 
specific processes could open up new and promising export opportunities for many staple commodities in 
both regional and global markets. One example of this is cassava, which accounts for the largest land 
allocation and highest agricultural value-addition in the country. Cassava chips and flours are excellent 
inputs for both the feed and agro-processing sectors, and are also in high demand within the international 
markets. Thailand accounts for 10 percent of world cassava production, exports 80 percent of its cassava 
products, and currently occupies 70–80 percent of the world cassava market with around 22 million tons 
of cassava traded annually (mostly as chips and flour). In Nigeria, cassava is presently produced primarily 
for domestic food consumption. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that with the adoption of high 
yield varieties, more cost-effective processing technologies, and improved market access conditions, 
Nigeria could successfully export cassava to the rest of the world. Under such a scenario, Nigeria could 
become a dominant cassava exporter in the world, and both the growth multiplier and poverty-reduction 
elasticity of cassava-led growth would increase further.  
Another example of agro-processing and export opportunities is seen in the poultry sector. Our 
model results show that poultry prices will fall significantly if high growth in poultry is targeted. Notably, 
however, current domestic poultry prices are not competitive; without border protection in imports, the 
domestic poultry price would not be as high as its current level. The model results indicate that Nigeria 28 
must improve the productivity of the poultry sector if the country hopes to get rid of its import restrictions 
and begin exporting poultry to neighboring countries in West Africa. The development of a modern 
poultry industry would provide not only great export opportunities in poultry products, it would also 
create more domestic demand for maize and other crops (as poultry feed), further enhancing the linkages 
and multiplier effects across the entire economy. An example of such a move toward becoming a large 
poultry exporter was seen in Thailand beginning in the late 1980s. The rapid growth in Thai poultry 
exports has created a large market for maize. Similar to the situation seen in Nigeria today, feed demand 
in Thailand prior to the shift accounted for only a small portion of maize production (3-7 percent). Today, 
following the development of the poultry industry, feed demand in Thailand accounts for 70-80 percent of 
maize production (a ten-fold increase over two decades). It is therefore reasonable to believe that 
development of the poultry sector in Nigeria would grow maize production, making it not only an 
important staple commodity for human consumption but an important cash crop for many smallholder 
farmers.  
Messages Drawn from Section 4 
Based on the analysis presented in this section, we believe that the following messages will be helpful in 
designing an agricultural strategy for Nigeria: 
1.   As a necessary first step toward creating an agricultural development strategy, growth targets 
set at the agricultural-subsectoral level should realistically take into account both the initial 
conditions and the growth potential of the subsector. Agricultural potential is an important 
condition, but it is not sufficient for target determination. In addition, growth targets should 
not be productivity driven, especially since increasing agricultural production through land 
expansion will be a costly proposition that is not likely to be sustainable. 
2.   The study shows that the following factors should be considered when prioritizing 
agricultural growth at the subsectoral level: (i) the size of an individual subsector in the 
current agricultural economy (share in agricultural GDP); (ii) the growth-multiplier effect of 
the subsector through its linkages with the rest of the economy; (iii) the poverty-reduction-
growth-elasticity effect through growth led by that particular subsector; and (iv) the market 
opportunities and price effects that a subsector’s growth could have. Based on these four 
factors, Table 10 summarizes the findings presented in this section. The discussion of Table 
10 is as follows: 
a. While a very high growth goal can be set for a small subsector, the economy-wide 
impact of this subsector’s growth will often be small. Growth in a relatively large 
subsector generally creates more growth for the economy as a whole. Our model 
analysis shows that even double-digit growth in a small subsector (e.g., wheat or sugar) 
may have little or no growth contribution to overall agriculture or the economy. On the 
other hand, a large agricultural subsector (e.g., rice or cassava) can create a large 
degree of economy-wide growth if it becomes the leading force in the growth process. 
b. When setting priorities, policy makers should consider the growth-multiplier effect 
among different agricultural subsectors. A subsector with strong linkages with the rest 
of the economy can generate more economy-wide gains than a subsector with weak 
linkages to the economy. A subsector that can stimulate domestic demand either 
through agro-processing or by generating income for a majority of farmers (e.g., 
cassava or poultry) often has a stronger multiplier effect on overall growth than a 
subsector that is only exported as primary materials.  
c. A negative price effect is often an indicator of market opportunities, and market 
constraints captured by price effects must be taken into account when designing an 
agricultural strategy. Growth is determined not only by productivity in the production 
processes of a targeted agricultural subsector, it is also constrained by market 29 
opportunities. Often, both domestic and export (or import substitution) market 
opportunities are interrelated with the development of agro-processing industries, trade 
policies in both domestic and international markets, and the market-access conditions 
faced by the producers. Thus, agricultural growth should be supported by pro-
agriculture investments and interventions outside of agriculture. This is a key for the 
successful implementation of an agricultural strategy.  
d. The pro-poorness of an agricultural subsector’s growth should be the top agenda when 
designing an agricultural strategy. Although agricultural growth is generally pro-poor, 
different types of agricultural growth can lift varying numbers of people out of poverty 
(in total and in different locations), depending on the country’s poverty distribution 
across regions and households. Carefully assessing the linkages between subsectoral-
level agricultural growth and poverty reduction at both the national and regional (state) 
levels and then taking advantage of such linkages are important steps for policy makers 
to take when seeking to ensure that agricultural growth is pro-poor.  
3.  Given Nigeria’s size and constitutional structure, the country’s agricultural performance is 
not simply dependent on strategies set by the federal government: The state governments are 
equally important players in determining the direction of agricultural development. 
Constrained by a lack of information on state-level policies and other economic data, we 
herein discuss only agricultural growth options for the country as a whole. While additional 
studies should be conducted at the state level, some of our results on priority setting for a 
national-level agricultural strategy may also be useful at the state level. Moreover, the inter-
linkages between strategies at the state and federal levels are important aspects of strategic 
analysis for agricultural development.      
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Table 10. Summary of factors affecting priority setting in an agricultural strategy  
  Size in the economy  Growth multiplier  Pro-poorness  Negative price effect  Opportunities 
  Qualitative 
assessment  Ranking  Qualitative 
assessment  Ranking  Qualitative 
assessment  Ranking  Qualitative 
assessment  Ranking   
Growth led by:                   
Cereals  Large  2  Large  3  Large  1       
   Rice   Large  4  Large  8  Large  2  Small  7  Import substitutable 
   Maize  Large  7  Large  5  Large  5  Large  2  Feed-industry development 
   Millet/sorghum  Large  5  Large  1  Large  3  Small  6  Food processing 
   Wheat  Small  13  Small  9  Large  11  Large  1  Import substitutable 
Roots  Large  1  Large  6  Large  3       
   Cassava  Large  3  Large  4  Large  7  Small  5  Exports through processing 
Pulses  Large  6  Large  2  Large  8      Domestic processing and exports 
Export-oriented crops  Small  9  Small  10  Small  12  Small  9  Scale-up the size  
Livestock  Small  8  Not measured  Large  9       
   Poultry  Small  12  Not measured  Not measured    Large  3  Competitiveness and exports 
Fishery  Large  10  Large  7  Large  6  Large  4  Food processing 
Forestry  Small  11  Not measured  Large  10  Small  8  Wood processing 
Source: Summarized from Nigerian DCGE model results for the CAADP growth scenario.31 
5.  PUBLIC SPENDING IN AGRICULTURE TO MEET ACCELERATED  
GROWTH AND POVERTY TARGETS
10
It is well known that the absence of developed local institutions and the underdeveloped state of many 
markets in developing countries necessitates government involvement in agricultural investment (Hoff, 
Braverman and Stiglitz 1993; Westlake 1994). Accordingly, based on the DCGE model results, we next 
estimate the public investments in agriculture that will be required over the next years (2009-17) to 
support the accelerated agricultural growth and poverty reduction modeled herein. The section is 
organized as follows: In Subsection 5.1, we first briefly describe the composition and trends of total 
revenue in Nigeria, and then review the patterns of government spending at the national and subnational 
government levels. In Subsection 5.2, we turn to a detailed examination of the level and growth of 
agricultural spending, and then compare agricultural spending to total spending and agricultural GDP, 
which may provide information on the magnitude of government resource allocation to the agricultural 
sector. In Subsection 5.3, we present our conceptual framework, data sources, scenarios, and estimation 
results for required agricultural spending.  
 
Trends and Magnitudes of Aggregate Revenues and Expenditures 
Fiscal decentralization and government accountability in Nigeria
11
Nigeria has a federal system of government in which three tiers of government coexist. In this multi-level 
system, the authority and responsibility for agricultural investment or spending are vested in all three 
levels of government. The evolution of the fiscal relationships among the different levels of the Nigerian 
government was influenced by principles of fiscal federalism, oil revenues, and the centripetal forces of 
military governments. Following constitutional conferences in 1953 and 1954, Nigeria adopted a federal 
constitution that included fiscal federalism for revenue sharing, and expenditure assignments between the 
federal government and the three regional (state) governments. After the country gained independence in 
1960, this principle was modified in the interest of national unity. Beginning in 1966, under successive 
military regimes, the government became increasingly centralized, and the regional allocations of 
revenues and expenditure responsibilities were engineered at the discretion of the central (military) 
government. Moreover, during this period, the distribution of national resources was extremely wasteful 
and inefficient (Bach 1989). From 1960-76, Nigeria was further subdivided from three to 19 states. In 
1976, the local governments were recognized as the third tier of government, and were defined as being 
entitled to statutory allocations from both the federal and state governments. During the following periods 
of military rule, the number of states almost doubled and the number of local governments also grew 
significantly.  
 
Currently, the subnational governments of Nigeria include 36 states and the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT) at the second tier, and 774 local governments at the third level of government. The 
existing division of revenue-generating powers and expenditure responsibilities across the three tiers of 
government in Nigeria is based on the principles of diversity, equivalence, centralized stabilization, the 
correction of spillover effects, fiscal equalization, and derivation (Ekpo 2004). The current assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities and functions is based on the second and fourth schedules of the 1999 
constitution. Part I of the second schedule includes a list of expenditures for which the federal 
government is solely responsible, as well as those for which both the federal and state governments share 
responsibility. The fourth schedule lists the responsibilities of the local governments. Based on the 
guidelines of the constitution, various legal and policy documents define the specific policy and 
                                                       
10 This section was written by Vida Alpuerto, Xinshen Diao, and Sheu Salau. 
11 This discussion of the political and economic contexts of decentralization is based on Ekpo (1994; 2004), Eboh, Amakom 
and Oduh (2006), and Odularu (2008). It was written by Kamiljon Akramov.  32 
expenditure responsibilities of the different tiers of government. Below, we discuss the specific policy and 
expenditure responsibilities of the government tiers as they pertain to the agricultural sector.  
The Nigerian constitution establishes that the vast majority of federally raised revenues must flow 
to the Federation Account, whereupon a formula is used to allocate the funds among the federal, state and 
local governments. There are two types of revenue allocation in Nigeria: vertical allocation, which is the 
sharing of revenue among the three tiers of government; and horizontal allocation, which is the allocation 
of revenue between state governments and among local governments within states. According to the 
current vertical allocation formula, 55 percent of total revenue is allocated to the federal governments, 25 
percent to the state governments, and 21 percent to the local government authorities. The horizontal 
allocation of the respective funds across the subnational governments is based on a special formula that 
includes five components: equality (40 percent); need, as defined by the population size (30 percent); land 
area (10 percent); social development factors (10 percent); and internal revenue-generating efforts (10 
percent). 
The major concern regarding Nigeria’s fiscal federalism is the existence of vertical fiscal 
imbalance, i.e., a mismatch between the revenue bases and the expenditure needs of the state and local 
governments. As in many developing countries, the subnational governments in Nigeria have very limited 
internal revenue bases and have a low potential for cost recovery because they serve largely poor 
populations. Thus, the subnational governments have limited revenue-generating powers. On the one 
hand, federally collected revenues usually amount to more than 90 percent of total government revenues, 
and most states’ internal revenues are less than 10 percent of their total revenues. On the other hand, 
expenditures by state and local governments account for more than 45 percent of total government 
expenditures. Hence, subnational expenditures are largely financed out of federal transfers. For example, 
in 2006, federal transfers accounted for 64 percent of the total state revenues. The reliance of local 
governments on federal transfers is even heavier; in 2006, an overwhelming 83 percent of local 
government revenues came from the Federation Account.  
This heavy dependence on federal transfers creates conditions that may favor a lack of 
accountability, as subnational governments may attempt to shift the responsibility for service delivery and 
the blame for failures onto the federal government, which controls the bulk of the government revenues. 
Furthermore, the local population may not hold the state and local governments accountable because they 
see them as not having the financial means to deliver services and/or are unaware of the federally 
allocated resources that are allocated. In this regard, it is important that the federal allocations to state and 
local governments have a high degree of transparency. In January 2004, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of 
Finance established a policy that sought to improve transparency at all levels of government, especially 
the state and local levels. According to this policy, the government was to use major national newspapers 
and the Federal Ministry of Finance website to publish monthly information regarding allocations from 
the Federation Account to the federal, state and local governments. State representatives later blocked the 
funding for the publication of this information in national newspapers, meaning that federal allocations 
are currently available only on the Federal Ministry of Finance website (World Bank 2008a). This may 
reflect that it may be difficult to achieve government accountability and efficiency under decentralization 
when there is a problematic scarcity of public sector administrative, financial, and managerial capacity at 
the lower levels of government (Collier 2008).     
The Nigerian Government’s Revenues and Expenditures Highly Depend on Oil  
Nigeria’s heavy dependence on federal transfers is primarily due to an imbalance in the country’s revenue 
sources, which are dominated by taxes and royalties from mineral resources. Prior to independence, 
agriculture was a major source of revenue. However, since the discoveries of oil in the 1970s, oil has 
become the country’s most important revenue-generating export (Budina and Wijnbergen 2008; 
Obinyeluaku and Viegi 2008). In fact, Nigeria has become the largest oil producer in Africa and the 
eleventh largest producer worldwide (Revenue Watch Institute, n.d.). Despite fluctuations, oil revenues 
have consistently comprised more than 60 percent of the government’s total revenues since 1980, and this 33 
value has been as high as 80-90 percent in many years. Figure 5 shows the oil and non-oil revenues 
between 1980 and 2005 normalized using consumer price index (CPI).  
Figure 5. Oil revenue, non-oil revenue, and total government revenue deflated by CPI, 1980-2007 
 
Source: CBN (2009).  
Note: The combined height of the bars represents the total revenue.  
This extreme oil dependency has led to a historical trend of unstable government revenues and 
expenditures, since oil revenues naturally follow the unpredictable fluctuations in world oil prices and 
OPEC-assigned oil quotas (Nigeria has been a member since 1958) (Ukwu et al. 2003; Obinyelauku and 
Viegi 2008) (Figure 6). Such variability impacts the stable provision of government services and can 
disrupt public spending to reduce poverty and support the diversification/growth in the non-oil sectors, 
particularly agriculture (Baunsgaard 2003). If Nigeria maintains its oil dependency and the recent oil 
price declines continue in coming years, the government will face tremendous challenges when seeking to 
provide the resources needed to accelerate agricultural growth. 
Figure 6. Annual changes in world prices for crude oil, Nigerian government oil revenue, total 
revenue, and total expenditures, 1980-2007  
  
Source: CBN (2009). 34 
Oil revenues dominate the revenues that go into the Federation Account, and the methods of 
distributing such revenues are distributed among the three tiers of government have engendered 
protracted and controversial debates (Uche and Uche 2004). Numerous attempts have been made to 
devise an acceptable revenue allocation formula; unfortunately, these attempts have largely been 
remembered more for the controversies they have generated than the issues they have settled (Uche and 
Uche 2004). The Nigerian constitution mandates that oil revenues should be shared among all tiers of 
government, with the oil-producing states receiving 13 percent upfront (USAID 2008). After withholding 
of the so-called “first charges,”
12 the remaining funds are distributed among the federal, state, and local 
governments as established by the Acts of the National Assembly (USAID 2008). About half of the net 
proceeds are distributed to the state and local governments according to a formula
13
Shares of the Federal and State Government Revenues in Total Government Revenue 
 decided by 
parliament every five years (Ahmad and Mottu 2002). This makes the state and local governments highly 
dependent on revenue-sharing arrangements with the federal government. As of February 2008, the 
remaining funds were to be allocated as follows: 52.7 percent to the federal government, 26.7 percent to 
the states, and 20.6 percent to local governments (USAID 2008). Controversies and political problems 
regarding this sharing arrangement often arise when the oil-producing states demand a larger share of the 
oil revenues, and/or the non-oil producers demand greater redistribution of the oil resources (Ahmad and 
Mottu 2002).  
Between 1981 and 2007, the shares of the federal and state government revenues in total revenue 
fluctuated (although the latter fluctuated at a smaller degree), strongly reflecting the volatility of oil as the 
main government revenue source (Figure 7). After a steep decline in the early 1990s, the share of federal 
revenue in total government revenue increased sharply between 1993 and 1999, creating a huge deviation 
in the oil revenue distribution between these two tiers of government. After 1999, the federal share started 
to decline while the state share increased. The increasing share of state revenue in total government 
revenue can be attributed to the states receiving a larger share of the Federation Account starting 1999, 
when civilian rule returned to Nigeria and the constitution was enacted to (in part) mandate oil revenue 
allocation. In the following years (2000-01) high oil prices further increased the distribution of financial 
resources from the federal government to the state and local governments, particularly to oil-producing 
states (Ahmad and Mottu 2002). However, this increased allocation took place without the corresponding 
assignment of new expenditure responsibilities (Ahmad and Mottu 2003). Law mandates that the state 
and local governments should provide public services, including education, health, public works, local 
utilities, and infrastructure. However, many of the subnational governments have failed to maintain 
information on their budgets, expenditure levels, and expenditure compositions. In addition, some of them 
have accumulated considerable bank debts (Ahmad and Mottu 2003). This has further constrained the 
ability of the federal government to stabilize overall expenditure, resulting in the transmission of fiscal 
volatility throughout the economy (Baunsgaard 2003).  
                                                       
12 The first charges include the 13 percent allocated to the oil-producing states, the government share of the production cost 
of oil (called “cash calls”), and funds for priority projects of the national oil company and the external debt service (Ahmad and 
Mottu 2002).  
13 A detailed discussion of this formula can be found in Ahmad and Mottu (2002, p. 17). 35 
Figure 7. Shares of federal and state government in total government revenue, and share of the 
Federation Account in state revenue, 1981-2007 
 
Source: CBN (2009).  
Trends of Growth in Government Expenditures vs. Economic Growth 
Table 11 presents the growth patterns in GDP and government expenditures during the period of 1981-
2007. The table displays the annual growth rates and expenditure shares for three periods: the period prior 
to the structural adjustment program (SAP)
14 (i.e. 1981-85; pre-SAP); the SAP period (1986-94); and the 
post-SAP period. Given that the SAP period was rather long, we further divide this period into two sub-
periods: the late 1980s (1986-90) and the early 1990s (1991-94). We also report the growth rates and 
shares in the post-SAP period during 2000-07. The data confirm that when GDP grew slowly due to oil 
price declines, particularly during 1981-85 and 1991-94 (0.3 and 1.1 percent, respectively), the total 
expenditure growth rate turned negative. After the SAP period, total expenditure experienced a very high 
growth rate (14.6 percent) even though the average GDP growth during 1995-99 was relatively low (2.8 
percent). Isolating the federal and state expenditures during this period reveals that the share of the former 
was 75.5 percent, while that for the latter was only 18.8 percent, down from 26.1 percent in 1986-90 and 
24.6 percent in 1991-94. On the other hand, there were years when the GDP growth rate was high but 
government expenditure posted negative growths. For example, GDP experienced relatively high growth 
as a consequence of oil booms in 2000, 2002, and 2006, but the expenditure growth rates were negative 
during these years.
15
   
 
                                                       
14 SAPs are changes in economic policies and conditions implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank in developing countries in response to economic disruptions (oil crisis and debt crisis among others) in the late 
1970s. After several failed reform efforts, the Nigerian government adopted a comprehensive SAP in 1986 that emphasized 
reliance on market forces and the private sector in dealing with economic problems. For a detailed discussion of the causes, 
processes, and outcomes of SAP in Nigeria, see NCEMA (n.d.) and Ayadi et al. (2008).  
15 The reason for these opposing patterns of growth in GDP and government expenditure is unclear, and hence deserves 
further investigation. 36 
Table 11. GDP and government expenditure growth (%), 1981-2007 
   Pre-SAP   SAP  Post-SAP 














6  2007 
GDP growth rate (%)  0.3  5.9  1.1  2.8  5.1  7.8  3.9 10.2 10.5 6.5  6.0  6.5 
Total government expenditure 
growth rate (%)  -15.1  9.6  -4.3  14.6  -3.4 23.7 -5.1 15.0 4.4  9.5  -0.4  12.5 
Share in total expenditure (%)                            
   Federal  55.5  73.9  71.5  75.5  57.7 57.0 53.2 48.9 47.3 46.9 46.2 45.4 
   State  44.5  26.1  24.6  18.8  29.6 33.4 37.9 36.7 37.3 38.0 37.9 39.2 
   Local*  0.0  0.0  3.9  5.7  12.7 9.6  8.9 14.4 15.3 15.1 15.9 15.3 
Ratio of total expenditure to 
GDP (%)  37.7  28.6  29.5  23.2  26.5 37.8 35.2 35.8 26.4 26.7 22.6 23.2 
Source: CBN (2009), CBN (2007, 2008) 
Notes:1. Local total government and local agricultural expenditures are available from 1993 onward. 
2. We distinguish among the later pre-SAP (1981-85), the early (1986-90) and later SAP (1991-94), and the early post-SAP 
(1995-99) periods. We present average data for each period and provide annual data starting in 2000.  
Trends and Magnitudes of Agricultural Spending  
We now turn to government agricultural spending, which is the focus of this study. Supporting the 
agricultural sector is a joint responsibility of the three tiers of governments, as mandated by the 1999 
constitution. Federal, state, and local government budget and expenditure information is published by 
several government agencies in Nigeria, including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Office of the 
Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF), the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (FMA), and the 
Budget Office of the Federation (BOF). In addition, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (FMARD) seems to have its own source of data for federal government spending on 
agriculture.  
Inconsistency of Agricultural Spending Figures across Different Data Sources  
The lack of good-quality social and economic data is a well-known problem in Nigeria, particularly in the 
case of expenditure data. First, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to gather complete time-series 
data for both total government and agricultural expenditures from a single source. For instance, federal-
level total government expenditure data are available for 1970-2007 from CBN (2009), but the same 
source only has state- and local-government-level data starting in 1980 and 1993, respectively. With 
regard to agricultural spending, it is even more difficult to obtain a complete time series for the three 
government levels from any single source. The only available time series is the budget estimates of the 
federal government agricultural expenditures between 1980 and 2007 (CBN 2009). The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has published a statistical index for Nigeria in various years, but these indices only 
contain budgeted (not actual) expenditure data at the federal level for 1992-2003. Moreover, in some 
years the data reported by IMF differ from those reported by CBN (2009), even though both data series 
were sourced from CBN. Several studies, including that by Fan et al. (2008), have documented time-
series data (1980-2005) on agricultural public spending in Nigeria using combined data reported by IMF, 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), and the authors’ own projections.
16
                                                       
16 Such data have also been cited by Mogues et al. (2008) and made available through the Regional Strategic Analysis and 
Knowledge Support System website (
 In recent years, data reporting 
http://www.resakss.org). Our discussion on agricultural spending and the respective graphs 
in this section are similar to those of Mogues et al. (2008). However, our values differ to some extent from those in Mogues et al. 
(2008) because the latter used agricultural spending data solely from Fan et al. (2008), while we herein combine data from CBN 
(2007; 2008; 2009), Fan et al. (2008), and IMF (various years).  37 
has significantly improved; the CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts began regularly reporting 
actual agricultural spending data starting in 2002 (it is now available for 2002-07). However, such a short 
period of actual spending data is not appropriate for use in an econometric estimation.  
In cases where data are available, they are often inconsistent across the different data sources. For 
example, the federal government total spending reported by CBN is 21-65 percent higher than that 
reported by OAGF-BOF between 2002 and 2005, and this trend holds true for both recurrent and capital 
expenditures (Table 12). The discrepancy is even more serious when we consider federal agricultural 
spending, where the data from CBN are 38 to 300 percent higher than those from OAGF-BOF. The 
second important data inconsistency across different data sources is found in the growth of spending over 
time. In most cases, CBN only reports expenditure data in current prices, meaning that  expenditure 
growth must be calculated using various deflators. For example, when Nigeria’s CPI deflator is applied to 
CBN data, the calculated average annual growth rates of the federal government total and agricultural 
expenditures are 7.0 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively, across 2002-05. In contrast, based on the data 
reported by OAGF-BOF, the calculated average growth rates of the federal government total and 
agricultural expenditure are -1.0 percent (it declined over time) and 7.6 percent, respectively, during the 
same period (Table 12). 
Mogues et al. (2008) noted that the agricultural expenditures provided by FMA do not correspond 
with the data provided by OAGF-BOF or CBN for the period 2002-05. As indicated by Mogues et al. 
(2008), this discrepancy is puzzling since the OAGF database is supposedly prepared based on transcripts 
provided by FMA. Comparison of the two databases (FMA vs. OAGF-BOF) showed major differences 
with regard to both budgeted and actual spending. On average, the difference amounted to more than 54 
percent of actual spending in agriculture (Mogues et al. 2008). In addition to this inconsistency, the 
authors were also unable to obtain a complete and detailed breakdown of the data for agricultural 
expenditure from FMA.  
Table 12. Comparison of federal expenditure data from different sources 
  




Federal total expenditure (current billion Naira)                 
 OAGF-BOF   752  842  743  927  1,263      -1.0 
   Recurrent  447  524  530  586  770       
   Capital  304  318  214  340  493       
 CBN     1,018  1,226  1,426  1,822  1,938  2,451  7.0 
   Recurrent    697  984  1,033  1,224  1,290  1,589   
   Capital    321  242  351  520  552  759   
Federal ag expenditure (current billion Naira)                 
 OAGF-BOF   16  11  12  16  21      7.6 
   Recurrent  7  6  7  8  13       
   Capital  9  5  5  8  8       
 CBN     45  16  50  77  107  164  8.7 
   Recurrent    12  8  11  16  18  28   
   Capital    32  9  39  60  90  136    
Share of federal ag expd in total expd (%)                 
  OAGF-BOF   2.1  1.3  1.6  1.7  1.7       
  CBN      4.4  1.3  3.5  4.2  5.5  6.7    
Source: OAGF-BOF is drawn from Mogues et al. (2008), CBN (2007; 2008).  
Note: Total spending in CBN (2007; 2008) is not equal to recurrent plus capital because the total includes transfers, which are 
disaggregated into capital or recurrent expenditures. Annual average growth is the authors’ own calculations, using CPI values 
from World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank (2008b) as a deflator.  38 
The Share of Agricultural Expenditure in Nigeria Falls behind that in Many Other African 
Countries, but Growth has Picked up Recently 
Despite the data problems discussed above, all sources of data show a consistent phenomenon: The share 
of agricultural spending in the total government budget of Nigeria is very low, at 1.1 to 5.9 percent. We 
use data from several sources to present the share of agricultural expenditure in total government 
spending and as a ratio to agricultural GDP over time. The sources are Fan et al. (2008) for the period 
1992-2001, CBN (2009) for 1971-91, and CBN (2007 and 2008) for recent years. The data clearly show 
that the share of agricultural spending in total spending has experienced large fluctuations (Figure 8). The 
share, which provides a good indicator of the amount of government attention paid to the agricultural 
sector, was as high as 5.9 percent in the early-to-mid-1980s, but stagnated to below 2 percent in 1990-
2000. In recent years (2001-07), the share of agriculture in total spending rose, fluctuating between 3.1 
and 4.4 percent, except in 2004, when it dipped to 1.9 percent. Under the CAADP framework, agricultural 
spending is targeted to be 10 percent of total government spending, which is twice the actual share in 
recent years (2002-07). While the recent improvements in budget allocation towards the agricultural 
sector can be seen in Table 13, Nigeria still lags behind countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, 
Malawi, and Senegal, which have either achieved or are close to achieving the 10 percent CAADP goal 
(Fan et. al 2009).  
Figure 8. Share of agricultural expenditure in total expenditure, and ratio of agricultural 
expenditure to agricultural GDP, 1981-2007 
 
Source: Fan et al. (2008), IMF (various years), CBN (2009), and CBN (2007; 2008).  
We have actual agricultural expenditure data at the federal and state levels only from recent years 
(i.e., 2002 to 2007), as reported in the CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (CBN 2007; 2008) 
(Table 13). For comparison purposes, we also show GDP and agricultural GDP during this period. 
Federal and state agricultural expenditures  increased during this period, with annual growth rates of 13.9 
and 11.0 percent, respectively. We were unable to find information on local-government agricultural 
spending, either from CBN or other sources. A collaborative survey by, CBN, and the National 
Communication Commission (NCC) in 2006 (NBS 2007b) reported that the agricultural and rural 
development expenditures of local governments amounted to 10 billion Naira in 2006. This is equivalent 
to about 15 percent of the state-level agricultural spending in the same year. The resources devoted to 
agriculture by the federal government averaged 4.3 percent of total federal expenditure, while the state 39 
government generally allocated 3.6 percent of its total budget to agricultural expenditure during 2002-
2007. 
Table 13. Level of agricultural expenditure at the federal and state levels, 2002-07 
  
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Annual average 
growth rate (%) or 
average share (02-07) 
Billion Naira in current price               
GDP  5,439  6,999  11,411  14,562  18,565  23,281  7.8 
  Ag GDP  1,883  2,136  3,904  4,763  5,940  7,574  7.0 
Total government expenditure  1,913  2,509  3,012  3,889  4,191  5,394  8.1 
Agricultural expenditure   67   47   93   133   173   237   13.0  
   Federal  45   16   50   77   107   164   13.9  
   State  22   31   43   57   65   73   11.0  
               
Share of ag in federal expd (%)  4.4  1.3  3.5  4.2  5.5  6.7  4.3 
Share of ag in state expd (%)  3.1  3.3  3.8  3.8  4.1  3.4  3.6 
Share of ag in total expd (%)  3.5  1.9  3.1  3.4  4.1  4.4  3.4 
Ratio of ag expd to ag GDP (%)  3.6  2.2  2.4  2.8  2.9  3.1  2.8 
Ratio of ag GDP to GDP (%)  34.6  30.5  34.2  32.7  32.0  32.5  32.8 
Source: NBS (2007a) and CBN (2007 and 2008) for expenditure data. 
Notes: The growth rate is the authors’ own calculations. CPI from WDI reported by World Bank (2008b) is used as a deflator for 
growth in spending, and constant GDP comes from NBS (2007a).  
*’ag’ refers to agriculture; ‘expd’ refers to expenditure.  
Agricultural spending is further measured as a ratio to agricultural GDP in order to assess their 
relationship. The ratio of agricultural expenditure to agricultural GDP is low in most years, although it 
peaked in the early 1980s. Between 1990 and 2000, the indicator stagnated around 1 to 2 percent. As can 
be seen in Figure 9, the agricultural sector historically accounted for over 30 percent of GDP. Placing the 
share of agricultural spending in total spending alongside the share of agriculture in GDP illustrates that 
although these values differ in magnitude, both have followed quite similar trends in some years. For 
example, when the share of agricultural GDP in the economy increased, so did the share of agricultural 
spending in total expenditure. In more recent years (2003-07), although the share of agriculture in GDP 
has declined, increases were seen in the share of agricultural expenditures in the total budget.
17
                                                       
17 The declining share of agriculture in GDP was primarily due to increases in world oil prices, which caused corresponding 
increases in the oil sector’s share in GDP (both measured in current prices). However, growth in agricultural GDP was much 
more rapid than growth in oil-sector GDP during this period because growth was measured using a constant price. 
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Figure 9. Share of agricultural expenditure in total expenditure and share of agriculture in GDP, 
1981-2007 
 
Source: Expenditure data come from Fan et al. (2008), IMF (various years), CBN (2009), and CBN (2007, 2008). GDP comes 
from NBS (2007a). 
The ratio of the agricultural expenditure share to the agricultural GDP share can be used to better 
measure the position of the agricultural sector in the country’s government budget allocation. A ratio of 1 
indicates that the government allocated its budget consistent with the contribution of agriculture to the 
country’s economy (Mogues et al. 2008). If the ratio is smaller than unity, then the agricultural sector did 
not receive the public funds consistent with its role in the economy. The long-term average during the 
period 1981-2007 is 0.07, signifying that the share of public resources allocated to the agricultural sector 
was equivalent to less than one-tenth of this sector’s contribution to the country’s economy (as measured 
by its share in GDP).  
Agricultural Spending is Highly Concentrated in a Few Programs  
Mogues et al. (2008) analyzed the structure and allocation of federal capital spending on agriculture in 
Nigeria from 2001-05, using data obtained from FMARD, which is the only data source from which such 
information may be obtained. Their findings indicated that nearly 97 percent of federal-level capital 
spending supported the crop subsector, while only about 3 percent was spent on livestock and fisheries 
combined. Moreover, spending is highly concentrated in a few areas; three out of 179 agricultural 
programs account for more than 81 percent of total capital spending in agriculture. The three dominant 
programs are: (1) fertilizer market stabilization, with an average annual allocation of 1.25 billion Naira, or 
43 percent of total capital spending in agriculture; (2) the food security component of the National Special 
Program for Food Security (NSPFS), with an average annual expenditure of 0.63 billion Naira, or 22 
percent of total capital spending in agriculture; and (3) the Silos Program for construction, maintenance, 
and market development for the country’s strategic grain reserve, with an average annual allocation of 
0.46 billion Naira, or 16 percent of total capital spending in agriculture (Mogues et al. 2008). Notably, 
since the agricultural capital spending from FMARD is equivalent to only about 4.2-16.0 percent of the 
capital agricultural spending reported by CBN (2009), the same amount of spending on fertilizer subsidies 
and the other two programs account for a much smaller share of total agricultural spending when using 
data sourced from CBN. Nonetheless, the country’s agricultural investment portfolio is unbalanced, 
concentrating resources to a small number of interventions while shorting others that are vital for 
accelerating agricultural productivity and pro-poor growth. These vital yet underfunded public 41 
investments include agricultural research and extension, capacity building among agricultural officials 
and farmers, agricultural financing, irrigation, and agribusiness development (Mogues et al. 2008).  
Estimated Spending Requirements for Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Poverty 
Reduction  
The quality of an econometric analysis depends on the availability and reliability of actual time-series 
data that span a sufficient period. Given the inconsistency of the agricultural expenditure data (see 
previous discussion), we decided to use data obtained from CBN for the analysis in this section. Although 
the CBN data cannot be disaggregated into different types of agricultural spending (e.g. spending on 
research and extension vs. fertilizer subsidies), this data set offers several advantages. First, the CBN data 
set covers a fairly long time period (1981-2006), and the data are published annually by CBN as part of 
the CBN Statistical Bulletin (the most recent version of the data was published in 2009). In contrast, the 
other sources offer government expenditure data over shorter periods; for example, the OAGF-BOF data 
used by Mogues et al. (2008) covered only 2002-05. The second benefit is that the government 
expenditure data published by CBN is relatively consistent with the GDP data published by the Nigerian 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). As discussed earlier and shown in Table 11, when the GDP growth rates were 
very low or negative (e.g., during the pre-SAP and SAP periods), growth in government expenditures 
either stagnated or declined. Conversely, when GDP registered a high growth rate (e.g., in the recent 
period after 1995), the growth rate in government expenditure was high. Third, the spending data obtained 
from CBN is consistent with government oil revenue, that is, as oil revenues increase (decrease), the 
federal government total expenditures increased (decreased) (Figure 6). Given that oil revenue is the 
dominant income source for the Nigerian government, this correlation is expected. The fourth advantage 
of utilizing the CBN data is that it includes expenditure at the federal, state, and local levels,
18
Conceptual Framework for the Estimation of Required Agricultural Spending  
 whereas 
the data obtained from other sources (e.g., OAGF-BOF) only provide federal expenditures. This is 
particularly important for analyzing agricultural spending, as the constitution mandates that state 
governments must play a role in the agricultural sector. This role has become increasingly important since 
the late 1990s when the federal government increased the oil revenue allocation to the state governments 
(see previous discussion, as well as Figure 7 and Table 11). 
For this analysis, we use agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) to estimate the required agricultural 
spending based on a conceptual framework in which growth in agricultural TFP is driven by growth-
enhancing public investments. If we let  represents aggregate agricultural output, then the production 
function of agricultural output is: 
   =   * f ( )  (1) 
where  represents the level of TFP and f(.) is the production function with a set of inputs, Ft. Obviously, 
growth in   augments the agricultural output beyond that generated by the increased use of inputs (e.g. 
labor, land, capital, and other inputs), which is decided on by the producers in a given production process.  
Although growth in TFP is not a choice variable for producers, it is often linked to public goods 
or services that generate positive externality in the growth process, thereby benefiting private agents 
(farmers). The public goods or services that generate such positive externality to agricultural growth 
include public investments in education and health (which improve human capital), as well as 
infrastructure investments and road network development, both of which reduce transportation and other 
market-related costs. Such public investments benefit the whole economy, including agriculture. 
However, since such investments do not necessarily target the agricultural sector, their impact on 
agricultural productivity is often embodied via economy-wide impacts. For example, healthy and 
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educated people are more productive, (but they do not necessarily work in the agricultural sector), while 
better road connection and increased road density in rural areas mainly benefit those who directly 
participate in trading and marketing. While these factors are outside agriculture, agriculture is indirectly 
benefited; therefore, we define the impact of such investments as indirect effects on agricultural growth.  
On the other hand, certain other investments (e.g., agricultural research and extension, irrigation 
development, land conservation and management) directly increase land productivity (yields) through the 
development of new technologies and bringing such technologies to more farmers through a public 
agricultural extension system. These investments directly target the agricultural sector and support the 
farmers’ use of modern technologies in agricultural processes. We define such investments as agriculture-
related investments, and consider them to have direct impacts on agricultural productivity growth. 
Dropping the time factor t to simplify the notation, the following equation mathematically describes the 
relationship between public investment and agricultural TFP,  :  
   =   (  ,   ,  )  (2) 
where   captures the direct effect of agriculture-related public spending on agricultural TFP; 
 captures the indirect impacts of public investment excluding agriculture-related investment 
(designated ‘nonagricultural investment’ for convenience) on agricultural TFP; and   represents the 
vector of other external factors on the farmers that do not directly relate to the factors of production (e.g., 
climate and the organization of the production process).  
In the present study, we mainly consider the effects of public spending aimed at the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors on growth in agricultural TFP. Since we were unable to obtain any reliable 
data or estimates for the linkage between agricultural and nonagricultural expenditures, we must ignore 
this multiplier effect. Assuming that there is a Cobb-Douglas-type relationship between TFP and public 
investment, the following equation holds:  
  ln   =  * ln  +  * ln  )  (3) 
where: 
ln  is agricultural TFP in log form; 
ln  is the value of agricultural expenditure in log form; 
ln ) is the value of nonagricultural expenditure in log form; 
is the elasticity of agricultural TFP with respect to agricultural expenditure; and 
is the elasticity of agricultural TFP with respect to nonagricultural expenditure.  
Equation (3) can be econometrically estimated using time-series data for agricultural TFP and 
agricultural and nonagricultural spending to generate the two elasticities. Given these elasticities, the 
following equation holds after we rearrange and take the total derivative of equation (3)
19
   =    (4) 
: 
where   is the change in agricultural spending determined by the difference between the change in 
TFP (  ) and the elasticity of TFP growth with respect to nonagricultural expenditure (   ) and 
change in nonagricultural spending ( ), then normalized by the elasticity with respect to the 
growth in agricultural spending ( ). Hence, equation (4) is used to assess the growth in 
agricultural spending required to support the targeted level of agricultural TFP growth. 
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Data and Elasticity Estimation 
The agricultural TFP data, given as a time series of indices, comes from Nin and Yu (2008), who 
conducted a non-parametric estimation using aggregated agricultural output and input data for all African 
countries. If time-series data on agricultural and nonagricultural spending are available, it is possible to 
econometrically estimate the elasticities,    and  . As discussed above, the quality of 
Nigerian government spending data (particularly that for agricultural spending) is relatively poor. Thus, 
we decided to use the results derived from the time-series (1980-2005) expenditure data of Fan et al. 
(2008). The estimated results show that the elasticity of agricultural TFP growth with respect to 
agricultural spending growth is 0.24
20
In contrast, the estimated elasticity of agricultural TFP growth with respect to nonagricultural 
spending is 0.46, which is much higher than the elasticity of agricultural spending (0.24). Given that the 
lion’s share of public good provision (e.g., investments in infrastructure, education, and health) is counted 
as nonagricultural spending, such an estimation result is not surprising. This type of spending will benefit 
the entire economy, including the rural economy and the agricultural sector. However, in terms of the 
effectiveness of 1 million dollars in spending, nonagricultural spending is not necessarily more effective 
than agricultural spending in promoting agricultural productivity growth. As discussed above, the value of 
nonagricultural spending is 20-25 times larger than that of agricultural spending in Nigeria. Thus, each 1 
percent of nonagricultural spending is equivalent to 20-25 percent of agricultural spending. Dollar-for-
dollar, this comparison indicates that agricultural spending is more effective than nonagricultural 
spending when looking at agricultural productivity growth.  
. That is, for every 1 percent growth in government agricultural 
spending, agricultural TFP grows by 0.24 percent. The value of this elasticity is consistent with that 
calculated for India (Fan et al. 2000) when agricultural research expenditure was used to estimate its 
marginal effect on total agricultural growth. Our estimated elasticity is somewhat higher than those 
obtained from other studies of African countries in which agricultural growth (instead of agricultural TFP 
growth) was chosen as the dependent variable. For example, the estimated marginal effects of agricultural 
spending on agricultural growth were 0.15 in a cross-sectional study of African countries as a whole 
(Benin et al. 2007), 0.17 for Rwanda (Diao et al. 2007), and 0.19 for Uganda (Fan et al. 2004). However, 
as mentioned above, the dependent variables in these studies were often overall agricultural growth (for 
which the TFP impact is only part of the story). Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the marginal effect 
of agricultural spending (particularly on research/extension and any other type of public goods/service 
provision) on agricultural TFP growth should be higher than that on overall agricultural growth (to which 
a high use of production inputs often contributes the lion’s share). By disaggregating agricultural 
spending, Fan et al. (2008) obtained an upper bound value of 0.36 when considering the marginal effect 
of agricultural expenditure on agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking into account the broad 
range of elasticities available in the literature, we feel comfortable using our estimated value of 0.24 with 
respect to agricultural spending. To further analyze the sensitivity of required spending with respect to the 
choice of elasticity (which partially reflects the efficiency of spending), we also consider a case in which 
the elasticity is 0.41 (i.e., a 70 percent increase over the estimated result of 0.24). 
Even with this explanation, however, we are still not comfortable using the calculated elasticity 
for nonagricultural spending in our analysis for the following reasons. First, our definition of 
nonagricultural spending is very broad. Without additional information allowing us to further 
disaggregate total spending, we must define nonagricultural spending as the difference between total 
spending and agricultural spending. Thus, part of the spending that is classified into the nonagricultural 
category may directly target agricultural and rural development. Second, given that the data quality for 
agricultural spending is poorer than for total spending, and agricultural spending is such a small portion 
(less than 4 percent in most years) of total spending, our estimates are likely to be biased because we do 
not fully distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of government spending (as suggested in the 
conceptual framework discussed above). Furthermore, if we apply the calculated elasticity for 
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nonagricultural spending to equation (4), the result is a negative growth rate in required agricultural 
spending. Past studies such as those of Fan et al. (2004) and Thurlow et al. (2008) have faced similar data 
quality problems in trying to estimate elasticity in other countries. Hence, following equation (4), we use 
a calibration method to help us choose an elasticity for nonagricultural spending that is consistent with the 
historical growth rates of agricultural TFP, agricultural spending, and nonagricultural spending. 
Specifically, in equation (4), we assign values to   and   according to the average growth 
rates of agricultural and nonagricultural spending between 2000 and 2007;   according to Nin Pratt and 
Yu (2008); and the estimated agricultural spending elasticity,  (which is 0.24) to calculate the 
nonagricultural spending elasticity,  . This calculation yields a data-consistent nonagricultural 
spending elasticity of 0.14, which we use in the following analysis. 
Scenarios and Results 
As discussed above, the DCGE model’s base-run gives an average annual growth of 5.7 percent for 
agricultural GDP and 6.5 percent for overall GDP, which are consistent with the average growth rates 
seen over the past seven years in Nigeria. Similar to real events during this period, agricultural growth in 
the model’s base-run is primarily driven by factor accumulation, and TFP only explains about 40 percent 
of total agricultural growth. The calculated agricultural TFP growth in the base-run is 2.3 percent 
annually over the simulated period of 2009-17. In the accelerated agricultural growth scenario (the 
CAADP scenario), the agricultural GDP annual growth rate rises to 9.5 percent. Since accelerated growth 
is largely led by productivity, the agricultural TFP growth rate rises to 5.6 percent annually over the same 
period. In this section, we estimate what level of growth in agricultural spending would be required to 
support the rapid growth modeled in the CAADP scenario.  
We consider four investment scenarios in assessing what level of growth in agricultural spending 
would be required to support the 5.6 percent agricultural TFP growth rate obtained from the accelerated 
growth scenario of the DCGE model. In the first scenario, we apply the econometrically estimated 
elasticity of agricultural TFP with respect to agricultural spending (i.e., 0.24). Assuming that the growth 
rate of nonagricultural spending is the same as the current trend (which is the same as in the base-run), 
and using an elasticity of 0.14 for nonagricultural spending, our analysis shows that 23.8 percent annual 
growth in agricultural spending will be required over the next years (2009-17) to support the desired 9.5 
percent agricultural growth rate. This result is consistent with the estimation of Fan et al. (2008), who 
found that 25.1 percent annual growth in agricultural spending would be required in order for Nigeria to 
achieve MDG1. However, when agricultural spending is assumed to be more efficient (as modeled in the 
second scenario, where we increase the value of elasticity from 0.24 to 0.41), agricultural spending only 
needs to grow at 13.6 percent per year (Table 14).45 
Table 14. Agricultural and total spending requirements under different scenarios  
Indicator  Base-run 
CAADP Target 
Agricultural TFP growth driven by 
agricultural expenditures only 
Accounting for indirect effect of 
nonagricultural expenditures on agricultural 
TFP growth 
low efficiency  high efficiency  low efficiency  high efficiency 
Annual growth rate in GDP (%)                
  GDP  6.5  8.0  8.0  8.0  8.0 
  Ag GDP  5.7  9.5  9.5  9.5  9.5 
  Nonag GDP  6.7  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5 
Annual growth rate in TFP (%)           
  Total TFP  2.5  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8 
  Ag TFP  2.3  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6 
  Nonag TFP  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0 
Annual growth rate in expenditures (%)            
  Total spending  7.0  8.6  7.4  9.1  8.5 
  Ag spending  4.7  23.8  13.6  17.5  8.5 
  Nonag spending  7.1  7.1  7.1  8.5  8.5 
Estimated results           
Share of Ag spending in total spending (%)           
  2008  4.2  5.8  4.9  5.1  4.4 
  2015  3.6  14.6  7.3  8.6  4.4 
  2017  3.5  18.6  8.1  9.9  4.4 
Ratio of Ag spending to AgGDP (%)           
  2008  2.9  3.8  3.2  3.5  2.9 
  2015  2.7  9.1  4.2  5.7  2.8 
  2017  2.7  11.7  4.5  6.5  2.7 
Ratio of total spending to GDP (%)           
  2008  21.3  21.0  20.8  21.5  21.3 
  2015  22.1  21.6  19.9  22.8  21.8 
   2017  22.3  22.2  19.7  23.3  22.0 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 46 
With the additional growth in agricultural spending and given the growth in nonagricultural 
spending, the share of agricultural spending in total government expenditure rises gradually. Currently, 
agriculture accounts for 4.2 percent of total government expenditure. In the first scenario (low elasticity; 
i.e. low spending efficiency), this share rises to 14.6 percent by 2015 and 18.6 percent by 2017. Under the 
second scenario (high elasticity; i.e., improved spending efficiency), the share of agricultural expenditure 
in total spending is 7.3 percent in 2015 and 8.1 percent in 2017 (Table 14 and Figure 10). In practice, it is 
important to emphasize that spending efficiency should be improved in order to better support agricultural 
growth in the face of limited resources. This is also important when we consider the CAADP target of 
allocating 10 percent of the government’s budget to the agricultural sector. If the government can 
significantly improve the efficiency of its agricultural investments by better allocating and managing 
public expenditure, much less spending will be required to support similar levels of agricultural and 
economic growth. Hence, the share of agriculture in total spending may not need to reach the full 10 
percent.  
Figure 10. Share of agricultural spending in total spending required for accelerated agricultural 
growth, 2008-17 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
In the first two scenarios, we assume that growth in nonagricultural spending is given at its base-
run level, and required agricultural spending is the only driver supporting accelerated agricultural growth. 
In other words, we ignore the indirect effects of additional nonagricultural spending growth on 
agricultural growth. In the third and fourth scenarios, however, we consider this factor and re-estimate the 
required agricultural spending under the low- and high-elasticity scenarios. Increased nonagricultural 
spending is assumed to be proportional to the nonagricultural sector’s TFP growth, which increases from 
2.5 to 3.0 percent per year in the base-run (Table 14). This growth in the DCGE model simulation is 
primarily due to growth linkages between agriculture and nonagriculture (i.e., improvement in the 
agricultural economy benefits the nonagricultural sector). Consistent with the increase in nonagricultural 
TFP growth, annual growth in nonagricultural spending needs to rise from 7.1 percent in the base-run to 
8.5 percent under the accelerated agricultural growth scenario. Additional nonagricultural spending is not 
only necessary for growth in the nonagricultural economy, it also indirectly affects growth in agriculture. 
Given a similar marginal indirect effect (i.e. the elasticity of 0.14 with respect to nonagricultural 
spending), part of the desired level of agricultural growth can be indirectly supported by additional 
government spending on the economy as whole. This lowers the required annual growth in agricultural 47 
spending from 23.8 percent to 17.5 percent given a low elasticity of agricultural spending (third scenario), 
and from 13.6 percent to 8.5 percent given a high elasticity (fourth scenario).  
Due to this slower growth in required agricultural spending, the share of agricultural spending in 
total government spending rises at a slower pace than seen in the first two scenarios. Agricultural 
spending accounts for 8.6 and 9.9 percent of total spending by 2015 and 2017, respectively, given a low 
elasticity (i.e. “Ag and nonag driven, low efficiency), and it stays at 4.4 percent over the period of 2009-
2017 given a high elasticity (i.e. “Ag and nonag driven, high efficiency) (Figure 10). These results further 
emphasize the importance of addressing the growth linkages between the agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors in both overall economic activity and government spending when setting targets for agricultural 
spending. 
Translated into monetary terms, our analysis shows that without taking into account the changes 
in government nonagricultural spending, under the first scenario (i.e. “Ag driven, low efficiency”), the 
government needs to increase its current investments in agriculture by 987 billion Naira and 1,635 billion 
Naira (in 2008 prices) by 2015 and 2017, respectively (Figure 11). When a more optimistic spending 
efficiency is assumed in the second scenario (i.e. “Ag driven, high efficiency”), additional agricultural 
spending will be 305 billion Naira by 2015 and 448 billion Naira by 2017, implying that improvements in 
investment efficiency could allow the government to save more than 4,300 billion Naira in total over a 
period of eight years (between 2009 and 2017), or more than 400 billion Naira per year on average.  
Figure 11. Additional agricultural spending required for accelerated agricultural growth 
(difference from the base-run), 2009-17 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Improvements in agricultural spending efficiency could also reduce the required total government 
spending. Under the first scenario, the annual growth in total government expenditure rises to 8.6 percent 
(Table 14) and reaches 10,452 billion Naira by 2017 (Figure 12), in contrast with the base-run’s 7.0 
percent annual growth and 8,817 billion Naira by 2017. Given a high elasticity (second scenario), the 
annual growth in total government spending is 7.4 percent and total government expenditure by 2017 is 
9,265 billion Naira, only 448 billion Naira more than the base-run’s figure for 2017. 48 
When additional growth in nonagricultural spending and its indirect effects on agricultural growth 
are taken into consideration (third and fourth scenarios), we see a relatively slow growth in the 
requirement for agricultural spending, implying the need for a relatively lower level of such spending 
over time. Given a low elasticity (third scenario), additional required agricultural spending reaches 509 
billion and 782 billion Naira by 2015 and 2017, respectively, instead of 987 billion and 1,635 billion 
Naira (Figure 11).  With high spending efficiency (fourth scenario), these values become 108 billion 
Naira by 2015 and 150 billion Naira by 2017 (instead of 305 billion and 448 billion Naira). However, as 
additional spending on the nonagricultural sector is taken into account, total government spending does 
not decline from that seen in the previous two scenarios. In fact, with either low or high efficiencies in 
agricultural spending, the total government spending rises over time (Figure 12). In other words, since 
nonagricultural spending accounts for a much larger share of total spending than agricultural spending, 
even with very rapid growth in agricultural spending, spending on the nonagricultural economy will 
mostly drive the increase in total government spending. 
Figure 12. Total spending required for accelerated agricultural growth, 2008-17 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Messages Drawn from Section 5 
Our results show that both the growth in agricultural spending required to support accelerated agricultural 
growth and the share of such spending in total government spending depend critically on two important 
factors: (i) the efficiency of agricultural investments; and (ii) the interaction of agriculture and 
nonagriculture in both broad economic activities and government investments. Growth in the agricultural 
sector and the rural economy depends on public investments in both agriculture and nonagriculture, and it 
is necessary to take into account possible increases in nonagricultural spending (e.g., on infrastructure, 
education, and health) when estimating required agricultural spending. Estimations of required 
agricultural spending will be quite different when the possible impacts of increased nonagricultural 
spending on agricultural growth are not taken into account. Given current (inefficient) agricultural 
spending patterns, the growth required in agricultural spending is extremely high, at 23.8 and 17.5 percent 
when considering growth only in agricultural spending (first scenario), or growth in both agricultural and 
nonagricultural spending (third scenario), respectively. The resources that must be mobilized by the 49 
government to support the desired level of accelerated agricultural growth could reach 18 percent of total 
spending by 2017 (Table 14). Looking at the recent spending trends of the Nigerian government (Table 
13), it appears unlikely that agricultural spending could be increased at such a high growth rate over the 
next years. The higher required agricultural spending growth will, in turn, drive rapid growth in total 
spending. If we consider the indirect effect of nonagricultural spending on agricultural growth but do not 
assume improved spending efficiency, the rate of required growth in total spending is even higher (9.1 
percent in the third scenario vs. 8.6 percent in the first scenario), although the allocation between 
agriculture and nonagricultural spending changes dramatically. Clearly, improving investment efficiency 
through improved budgetary process, timely release of funds, greater transparency, and strengthened 
accountability of public spending in the sector is a critical channel through which the Nigerian 
government may be able to effectively support the accelerated agricultural growth needed to meet MDG1. 
If agricultural investment efficiency is increased by 70 percent (i.e., the marginal effect of spending on 
agricultural TFP rises to 0.41 instead of the current 0.24), the required growth for both agricultural and 
total spending will be significantly lower and the share of agricultural spending in the national budget can 
be less than the 10 percent CAADP requirement.  50 
6.  LINKING AGRICULTURAL SPENDING TO FARMERS’ RESPONSES
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While it is necessary to quantitatively assess the level and growth of public spending in agriculture 
required to financially support the desired levels of accelerated agricultural growth and poverty reduction, 
it is equally important to analyze how the government should allocate and spend such funding to promote 
agricultural public service provision. Improvements in agricultural growth (particularly productivity), 
may be critically influenced by such efforts. However, a relative lack of data limits our ability to 
quantitatively analyze the relationship between public fund allocation/public service provision and 
agricultural growth. Instead, a more innovative approach must be developed for this purpose. Here, we 
use household-level data from the 2006 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey to assess 
the role of agricultural services in promoting agricultural productivity growth. In particular, we focus on 
the relationship between agricultural services and the use of modern inputs (fertilizer) by farmers. Given 
that this survey is representative at the national and state levels and covers more than 75,000 households 
and 7,700 communities in all LGAs and states of Nigeria, this analysis can provide at least a partial 
assessment of the efficiency of agricultural spending in terms of agricultural service provision. As a 
prelude to econometric analysis, we first describe the basic features of the data and discuss some 
descriptive findings. 
  
The CWIQ survey provides information on agricultural input use and the sources of these inputs, 
along with community-level information on various social and economic projects. It also includes data on 
the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of the surveyed households, as well as their access to and 
use of various social and economic services. The survey design allows indirect assessment of the 
efficiency of agricultural service provision by the public sector. For the present study “non-agricultural” 
households were excluded, resulting in a sample size of about 56,600 households nested within 774 LGAs 
and 37 states (including the FCT). The definitions and descriptive summaries of the variables used in this 
analysis are provided in Table 15. 
The data suggest that only 46.4% of all farm households in Nigeria use modern agricultural inputs 
such as improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Most of the input-utilizing farm households 
use chemical fertilizers (42.8 percent of all farmers), while only a few farm households use improved 
seeds (7 percent) or pesticides (10.5 percent). The majority (87.5 percent) of the farmers that use modern 
agricultural inputs buy them in the open market, while the remainder purchase their inputs through the 
public sector. Significant variations in modern input use are seen across the various subnational regions. 
For example, about 80 percent of all farm households in the Northwest zone use modern inputs, while 
only 16 percent in the South zone use such inputs. Two important community-level variables measure 
whether a given community received an agricultural service project during the five years prior to the 
survey; these projects were divided into those provided by the public (GASP) and private (PASP) sectors. 
The survey results suggest that the public sector (which includes all government levels and donors) 
mainly funds projects that provide subsidized inputs to credit and extension services, whereas the private-
sector projects mainly focus on agricultural input and output markets. The data show that approximately 
42 percent of the surveyed communities received at least one agricultural service project over the five-
year period prior to the survey. About 45 percent of the surveyed farm households reside within a 
community that received at least one agricultural service project. The breakdown by service providers 
reveals that only 18.8 percent of the surveyed communities (encompassing 21 percent of the surveyed 
households) received agricultural service projects provided by the public sector, while about 38 percent 
(encompassing 40 percent of the surveyed households) received such projects provided by the private 
sector. 
                                                       
21 This section draws from Akramov, K. 2009. Decentralization, agricultural services, and determinants of input use in 
Nigeria. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 00941. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.    51 
Table 15. Descriptive summary of variables  












Independent variables   
Community-level variables 
  Has access to all-season roads (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
  Had at least one agricultural service project in the prior five years 
     Public (GASP = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 

















   Household size (number of people in the household) 
   Marital status of household head (1 if married, 0 otherwise) 
   Household head’s gender (1 if male, 0 otherwise) 
   Age of the household head, years  
   Household head’s education (1 if at least primary school, 0  
   otherwise) 
   Household member is government employee (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
   Income quintiles 
     First 
     Second 
     Third 
     Fourth 
     Fifth 
   Agriculture is main activity (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
   Land holdings (hectares) 




















































Access to agricultural services 
  Credit access (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 











     Sudan savanna (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
     Guinea savanna (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
     Derived savanna (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
















Source: CWIQ (2006) 
Concerning the allocation of agricultural service projects across states, the data show significant 
variations (coefficient of variation = 0.42). For example, only 7 percent of the surveyed communities in 
Imo state received at least one agricultural service project, while more than 70 percent of the communities 
in Kebbi state received such projects
22
                                                       
22 In this regard, Zamfara state, where more than 90% of communities received at least one agricultural service project, 
appears to be an absolute outlier.   
. There is a sizeable correlation (0.56) between the provision of 
public- and private-sector agricultural service projects across states, but this correlation is considerably 
lower (0.34) when measured at the community level. Substantial correlation (0.57) is seen between public 
agricultural service provision and input use at the state level. Figure 13 shows that states with higher 
public agricultural service provision are more likely to have higher rates of input use. This correlation, 52 
however, becomes substantially smaller (0.17) when measured at the household level. Overall, all other 
factors being equal, farmers who live in communities that received agricultural service projects are more 
likely to use modern inputs. 
Figure 13. Public-sector agricultural service projects and input use in Nigerian states 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on CWIQ (2006).  
Access to all-season roads is another important community-level variable and it is expected to 
correlate positively with input use. The data suggest that about 54 percent of the surveyed communities 
have access to all-season roads. However, the simple descriptive analysis shows no significant correlation 
between access to all-season roads and agricultural service provision. For example, the pairwise 
correlation between access to all-season roads (RD) and agricultural service projects provided by public 
sector (GASP) is equal to 0.09.    
Concerning the important household characteristics, such as the use of agricultural extension and 
credit, the data indicate that very few farmers (1.3 percent)
23
                                                       
23 This is the share of surveyed farmers who report using an agricultural extension service. 
 in Nigeria use extension services. This is 
very low compared to the rates found in many other countries in the region, and seems to support the idea 
that the withdrawal of World Bank loans has negatively impacted the performance of agricultural 
extension in Nigeria (Oladele 2004). About 18 percent of the sampled farm households report using credit 
facilities. However, only 6.8 percent of them use formal or semi-formal credit facilities (e.g., banks, 
microfinance institutions, and credit cooperatives), while 11.2 percent use informal credit facilities, such 
as esusu. The descriptive analysis shows that there is considerable variation in access to credit across the 
geopolitical zones and states of Nigeria. The highest level of credit use is seen in the Southwest (28 
percent) and North-central (26 percent) zones, while the Northeast (9 percent) zone has the lowest level of 
credit use by agricultural households. The ceteris paribus effects of these variables on input use are 
expected to be positive based on previous research (World Bank 2007). However, the simple descriptive 
analysis shows no significant correlation between the use of credit/extension services and modern inputs 
in Nigeria. Also, no significant correlation is seen between these household-level variables and the 
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Access to Agricultural Services and Input Use: The Empirical Results 
There is consensus in the literature that increased use of modern inputs (e.g., fertilizer, improved seeds, 
etc.) is necessary to enhance agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, as noted above, 
more than half of the agricultural households in Nigeria do not use such inputs, and there are significant 
variations in agricultural input use across the Nigerian states. Moreover, there are significant between-
state variations in access to infrastructure (roads) and agricultural services. In this regard, we next turn to 
an examination of whether or not agricultural service provision and public investments can affect 
agricultural input use in Nigeria.  
Assume that the utilization of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer or improved seeds, is 
determined by the expected profitability of using such inputs, given their availability. The expected 
profitability of modern input use is affected by input prices, fixed and variable transaction costs (Jayne et 
al. 2003; Winter-Nelson and Temu 2005). The relative magnitudes of these transaction costs depend on 
the farmers’ accesses to infrastructure (roads) and agricultural services. For example, subsidized input 
supply services, if appropriately targeted, can help increase input use among poor farmers, while 
agricultural extension services might positively influence input use by improving the farmers’ knowledge 
of the benefits of modern inputs. Similarly, access to all-season roads can reduce farmers’ travel costs, 
thereby positively influencing input use (Johnson et al. 2003). Furthermore, access to credit is likely to 
ease the farmers’ financial constraints, consequently increasing input use (World Bank 2007). However, 
in Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, most farmers lack access to such important services 
due to inadequate institutions and imperfect markets. This makes the government involvement in the 
provision of such services desirable (Hoff et al. 1993; Westlake 1994), as the government can improve 
input use by fixing market failures and reducing the transaction costs associated with input use (Kelly 
2006; Gregory and Bumb 2006; Morris et al. 2007).  
The actual impact of government involvement in agricultural service provision depends on the 
effectiveness of the institutional arrangements for the provision of such services. In this regard, 
decentralization can have important implications. By bringing decision-making closer to the people, 
decentralization may ensure greater differentiation, efficiency and equity in the provision of agricultural 
services. This could happen if the subnational governments have greater access to local information 
regarding the preferences and needs of their residents (World Bank 2007). At the same time, however, 
decentralization may engender different enabling environments across subnational jurisdictions, due to 
differences in the socio-economic potential and capacity of each subnational government. These 
variations across the subnational governments’ potentials and capacities are likely to have important 
implications for agricultural service provision and input use. In a decentralized structure outcomes within 
the same state are likely to be correlated, and that outcomes within the same LGA are even more likely to 
be highly correlated. Thus, the empirical model should take into account the hierarchical structure of data 
where units (households) are nested in clusters (local governments) and clusters are nested in 
superclusters (states).  
This type of data structure requires the use of a multilevel regression framework, in which a 
nested random effects estimator is used to explicitly model the dependence in the error term (Rabe-
Hasketh et al. 2005). This method decomposes the error term into error components. Accordingly, we use 
the following specification for a three-level mixed effects logistic regression model
24
       (5) 
 for agricultural 
input use for household i, which is nested in local government area k within state h as:  
where:  
 is a binary variable for the input use for household  , which is nested in 
community j, local government area k, and state h; 
                                                       
24 For details of model specification and discussion of related econometric issues, see Akramov (2009).   54 
 is a matrix containing household characteristics;   
,  , and   are measured at the community level;  and 
show whether a given community received at least one agricultural 
service project during the five years prior to the survey, provided by public and 
private sources, respectively, while   shows whether a given community 
has access to all-season roads; and 
 represents the state effects,   stands for the LGA effects, and   is a mutually 
independent error term that has a logistic distribution with a variance of π
2/3. 
This is a generalized mixed-model specification with both fixed effects (regression coefficients 
for household- and community-level covariates) and random effects. The random effects in equation (6) 
include   and  , which represent deviations of local-government specific (level 2) and state-specific 
(level 3) random intercepts from the mean intercept  , respectively. Thus, equation (6) estimates the 
impact of access to all-season road and public- and private-sector agricultural service provision on the 
farmers’ modern input use, while controlling for household characteristics and LGA- and state-specific 
latent effects. The error component for state effects (which is invariant across all farm households within 
a given state) can be considered to be the combined effect of the omitted covariates and/or the unobserved 
heterogeneity at the state level. Similarly, the error component for LGA effects (which is invariant across 
all farm households within a given LGA) can be considered to be the combined effect of the omitted 
variables and/or the unobserved heterogeneity at the local-government level within a given state. In 
addition to equation (5), we estimate a random coefficient model by assuming that a slope for all-season 
road access for each state deviates from the mean slope for this variable. The parameters of these models 
are estimated using the nested random effects estimator proposed by Rabe-Hasketh et al. (2005).  
The descriptive findings presented above show that only a fraction of Nigerian farmers use 
improved seeds (7 percent) and chemical pesticides (10.5 percent). Moreover, the data indicate that most 
of the farmers who use improved seeds and pesticides also use fertilizer. Therefore, it is logical to focus 
on examining the impact of agricultural service provision on fertilizer use. Table 16 shows the maximum 
likelihood estimates from nested two- and three-level mixed effects (random-intercept and random-
coefficient) models, along with those from the standard logit model of fertilizer use. The two-level mixed 
effects models assume that the households are nested in states, and do not control for deviations across 
LGAs.  
Table 16. Determinants of fertilizer use in Nigeria (Dependent variable = fertilizer use) 
Variable  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 
Household size (log)  0.30**  0.31**  0.31**  0.30**  0.30** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Married  0.07  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.02 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Primary school  0.12**  0.10**  0.10**  0.08**  0.08** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Income quintile 1  -1.06**  -0.76**  -0.79**  -1.02**  -1.04** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Income quintile 2  -0.63**  -0.47**  -0.50**  -0.67**  -0.69** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Income quintile 3  -0.28**  -0.22**  -0.25**  -0.38**  -0.41** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Income quintile 4  -0.03  -0.05  -0.07  -0.16**  -0.17** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
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Table 16. Continued 
Variable  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 
Gender  0.01  -0.10  0.09  0.12  0.12 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Age (log)  -0.26**  -0.28**  -0.29**  -0.29**  -0.30** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Land holding size (log)  0.14**  0.15**  0.15**  0.18**  0.18** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Credit   0.21  0.27**  0.27**  0.26**  0.25** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Extension  0.45**  0.28**  0.28**  0.44**  0.45** 
  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
GASP   0.43**  0.31**  0.30**  0.29**  0.29** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
GASP *POOR  0.04  -0.09  -0.09  -0.13*  -0.14* 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
PASP   -0.12**  0.11**  0.12**  0.09**  0.08* 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Civil servant  -0.11**  0.10*  0.10**  0.13**  0.13** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Agric. as main activity  0.24**  0.22**  0.23**  0.31**  0.32** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
All-season road access  -0.24**  -0.08**  -0.14  -0.02  -0.10 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
Sudan savanna  0.43**  0.64  0.57  0.78  0.65 
  (0.03)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.79)  (0.61) 
Derived savanna  -0.60**  0.67  -0.61  -0.88  -0.93 
  (0.04)  (0.56)  (0.59)  (0.67)  (0.68) 
Rainforest  -1.25**  -1.54**  -1.54*  -2.07**  -2.10** 
  (0.04)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.61)  (0.61) 
Constant  0.67  0.19  0.28  0.20  0.37 
 
 
(0.14)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.52)  (0.53) 
State (random intercept)    1.00**  1.05**  1.15**  1.17** 
    (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
State (random coefficient for road access)      0.42**    0.37** 
      (0.06)    (0.06) 
LGA        1.25**  1.25** 
        (0.04)  (0.04) 
N  53,694  53,694  53,694  53,694  53,694 
No. of  states    37  37  37  37 
No. of  LGAs        774  774 
Log likelihood  -31425.9  -27421.6  -27315.8  -23781.2  -23729.8 
Pseudo R squared  0.14  0.25  0.25  0.35  0.35 
Source: Authors’ own estimations. 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses; ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
The reference category for the income quintiles is income quintile 5; the reference category for the agro-ecological zones is the Guinea 
savanna zone. 
F1 shows the results from a standard logistic regression model with robust standard errors. 
F2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for a two-level (households nested in states) random-intercept model.  
F3 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for a two-level (households nested in states) random coefficients (for access to roads) 
model. 
F4 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for a three-level (households nested in LGAs and LGAs nested in states) random-intercept 
model.  
F5 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for a three-level (households nested in LGAs and LGAs nested in states) random-
coefficients (for access to roads) model. 56 
Overall, the estimated nested models reveal significant heterogeneity in the likelihood of fertilizer 
use across states and LGAs. The two-level (households nested in states) random-coefficient (F3) model 
suggests that states vary in their intercepts, with an estimated random-intercept standard deviation of 1. 
The three-level (households nested in LGAs, which are nested in states) random-intercept model (F4) has 
an estimated random-intercept standard deviation of 1.05, suggesting that its deviations from the mean 
intercept are even larger. The state-specific random-intercepts (data not shown) are both statistically and 
practically significant for almost all of the states. The state-specific intercepts suggest that households 
residing in states such as Kano (with an estimated odds ratio of 3.6), Kaduna (9.5), Katsina (5.3), Zamfara 
(4.7), and Anambra (3.0) have significantly higher likelihoods of using fertilizer, ceteris paribus. In 
contrast, households residing in such states as Borno (with an estimated odds ratio of 0.31), Ekiti (0.15), 
Cross River (0.51), Delta (0.44), Yobe (0.14) and Taraba (0.29) have significantly lower probabilities of 
fertilizer use, ceteris paribus.   
The three-level models also reveal significant variances among LGAs in the farmers’ likelihood 
of fertilizer use; the LGAs vary in their intercepts, with an estimated random intercept standard deviation 
of 1.25. Overall, the regression diagnostics suggests that the three-level mixed effects logistic regression 
model fits better than the standard and two-level mixed effects logit models at the 1 percent significance 
level (using a conservative likelihood ratio test). Furthermore, the same test indicates that the three-level 
random-coefficient (F5) model fits better than the three-level random-intercept (F4) model at the 5 
percent significance level. Thus, the discussion of the findings provided below is mainly based on the 
findings of the three-level random-coefficient (F5) model. 
The empirical results suggest that the provision of agricultural service projects by the public 
sector positively impacts fertilizer use by farm households in Nigeria. Farm households in communities 
that had at least one agricultural service project provided by the public sector are about 1.33 times more 
likely to use fertilizer compared to households in communities that did not receive such projects. 
However, there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction of this variable 
with the “poor farmer” dummy (representing households in the first and second income quintiles), 
indicating that poorer farm households are less likely to be targeted. Together, these results suggest that 
wealthier households are more likely to benefit from agricultural service projects provided by the public 
sector. This finding has two important implications. First, the differences in the odds ratios of fertilizer 
use between wealthier and poorer households are much greater in communities that received at least one 
agricultural service project. Second, all other things being equal, poor households in communities with at 
least one agricultural service project are likely to have a lower odds ratio of fertilizer use compared to 
their counterparts in communities without any agricultural service project. Given that these projects 
mainly focus on the provision of subsidized fertilizer to farmers, one can expect that such projects might 
have crowded out the private sector, and thus could actually lower the likelihood of fertilizer use by poor 
farmers. This finding is consistent with previous reports indicating that public-sector efforts at improving 
input supply can crowd out the private sector and reduces overall fertilizer use in some areas (Xu et al. 
2009; Kelly et al. 2003). It is worthy to note that the results also suggest that use of credit and agricultural 
extension services positively correlate with fertilizer use. The estimates from the three-level random 
coefficient model suggest that households that report using credit and extension services are about 1.3 
times more likely to use fertilizer. 
Further, the overall impact of access to all-season roads on fertilizer use appears to be 
insignificant, which is surprising given previous reports suggesting that access to roads can drastically 
reduce the cost (and thus increase the use) of modern inputs (Gregory and Bumb 2008; Dercon et al. 
2008). However, the results from the two- and three-level random coefficient models suggest that the 
relationship between road access and fertilizer use is heterogeneous across states. The standard deviation 
of the slope of access to roads, which can be interpreted as the residual variability in the impact of road 
access on fertilizer use across states, is estimated at 0.42 (model F3). This deviation slightly decreases to 
0.37 when the three-level model is estimated. These findings suggest that although the mean slope for 
access to all season roads is statistically insignificant, the state-specific slopes vary significantly. The 
state-specific slopes for road access (which are not reported here) show that the impact of road access on 57 
fertilizer use is positive in six states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Nasarawa, Oyo, and Yobe), negative in 
eight states (Anambra, Edo, Enugu, Kaduna, Plateau, Rivers, Zamfara, and FCT), and statistically 
insignificant in the remaining 23 states. Arguably, this heterogeneity might be due to differences in the 
development of road networks, in that some states may have developed roads in areas of high agricultural 
potential, while other states may have built roads away from such areas.  
Further, the results suggest that household size and the household head’s level of education have 
positive impacts on fertilizer use, while the household head’s age has a negative impact on fertilizer use. 
Moreover, the household income has a positive impact on input use, with the estimated coefficients 
suggesting that households in the lower income quintiles are significantly less likely to use fertilizer 
compared to households in the upper income quintiles. For example, all other things being equal, the farm 
households in the lowest quintile are about three times less likely to use fertilizer compared to farm 
households in the fifth income quintile. The analysis also reveals that households whose heads practice 
agriculture as a main activity are 1.4 times more likely to use fertilizer than other households. Households 
with a civil servant in residence are also more likely to use fertilizer. Furthermore, the operational land 
holding size is found to positively affect fertilizer use; a unit change in the log of operational land 
holdings, conditional on the mean values of the other regressors, increases the likelihood of fertilizer use 
by 1.2 times. Finally, the results also indicate that farmers in the Rainforest zone are less likely to use 
fertilizer compared to farmers in the other agro-ecological zones. These results are robust and consistent 
across all estimated models. 
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Despite Nigeria’s relatively impressive growth rate in recent years, poverty remains widespread. The 
good news is that a key driver of recent growth in the country has been the agricultural sector, which 
holds the most promise in reducing poverty. Recognizing this, the government has initiated and endorsed 
many national and international programs to support agricultural growth, including NEEDS II and the 
recent food security and agricultural development strategy developed under the CAADP framework. This 
study first analyzes the agricultural growth that will be required among different agricultural subsectors in 
order to achieve the agricultural development goals set by these programs. To accomplish this, we 
develop an economy-wide, dynamic general equilibrium (DCGE) model for Nigeria and use this model 
for a series of scenario assessments. The modeling analysis yields important findings that will be helpful 
in setting growth priorities among different agricultural subsectors. 
First, an agricultural development strategy must set subsectoral-level growth targets that 
realistically consider both the initial conditions and the growth potential of a given subsector. Agricultural 
potential is an important condition, but it should not be used alone when determining targets. 
Furthermore, growth targets should be productivity-driven because increased agricultural production 
through land expansion is likely to be costly, and may not be sustainable. 
This study emphasizes the following four factors as being important when prioritizing agricultural 
growth at the subsectoral level: (i) the size of an individual subsector in Nigeria’s agricultural economy 
(which can be measured by its share in agricultural GDP); (ii) the growth-multiplier effect of this 
subsector through its linkages with the rest of the economy; (iii) the poverty-reduction-growth-elasticity 
of growth primarily led by this subsector; and (iv) the market opportunities and price effects of individual 
agricultural commodities.  
In terms of the first factor, the subsector size matters because if a subsector is small, even setting 
(and achieving) a very high growth goal may have only a small economy-wide impact. Our DCGE 
modeling simulations show that even double-digit growth in a small subsector (e.g., wheat or sugar) may 
have a negligible (or nonexistent) contribution to overall agriculture or the whole economy. On the other 
hand, a large agricultural subsector (e.g., rice or cassava) can create more economy-wide growth if it 
becomes the leading force in the growth process. 
When setting priorities, policy makers should also consider the growth-multiplier effects among 
different agricultural subsectors. A subsector that has strong linkages with the rest of the economy can 
generate larger economy-wide gains than a subsector having weak linkages with the economy. A 
subsector that can stimulate domestic demand either through agro-processing or by generating income for 
a majority of farmers (e.g., cassava or poultry) often has a stronger multiplier effect on overall growth 
than a subsector that is only exported as primary materials. 
A negative price effect is often an indicator of fewer market opportunities, and the constraints 
posed by this situation should be taken into account when designing an agricultural strategy. Growth is 
not only determined by productivity in the production processes of a targeted agricultural subsector, it is 
also constrained by market opportunities. Often, both domestic and export (or import substitution) market 
opportunities are interrelated with the development of related agro-processing industries, trade policies in 
both domestic and international markets, and the market access conditions faced by producers. Thus, 
agricultural growth needs to be supported by pro-agriculture investments and interventions outside 
agriculture. This is key for the successful implementation of an agricultural strategy.  
The pro-poorness of an agricultural subsector’s growth should be the top agenda in an agricultural 
strategy. Although agricultural growth is generally pro-poor, different types of agricultural growth can lift 
varying numbers of people out of poverty (in total and in different locations) depending on the country’s 
poverty distribution across regions and among households. Carefully assessing and taking advantage of 
the linkages between subsectoral-level agricultural growth and poverty reduction at both the national and 
regional (state) levels will be important when policymakers seek to ensure that the resulting agricultural 
growth will be pro-poor.  59 
Given Nigeria’s size and constitutional structure, the country’s agricultural performance is not 
solely dependent on the strategies set by the federal government; the state governments are equally 
important players in determining the direction of agricultural development. Since this study was 
constrained by the lack of information on state-level policies and other economic data, we herein discuss 
only country-wide agricultural growth options. While additional studies are warranted at the state level, 
some of our national-level results may also be useful at the state level, in terms of priority setting in an 
agricultural strategy. Moreover, the inter-linkages between strategies at the state and federal levels are 
another important aspect of strategic analysis for agricultural development.      
The second part of this study focuses on the public investments that will be required to support 
the desired agricultural growth acceleration and poverty reduction. Our investment analysis shows that 
required growth in agricultural spending and the share of such spending in total government spending 
depend critically on two important factors: (i) the efficiency of agricultural investments; and (ii) the 
interaction of agriculture and nonagriculture in both broad economic activities and government 
investments. Growth in the agricultural sector and the rural economy depends on public investments in 
both agriculture and nonagriculture, and it is necessary to consider possible increases in nonagricultural 
spending (e.g., on infrastructure, education and health) when estimating required agricultural spending, as 
the results will be quite different when possible impacts of increased nonagricultural spending on 
agricultural growth are not taken into account. With the current inefficient agricultural spending patterns 
in Nigeria, the required growth in agricultural spending is extremely high (between 17.5 and 23.8 
percent), and the government resources needed to support the accelerated agricultural growth will reach 
18 percent of total spending by 2017. In view of the country’s recent spending trends, it is obviously 
unlikely for the Nigerian government to increase agricultural spending at such a high pace over the next 
years. The higher required agricultural spending growth will, in turn, drive rapid growth in total spending. 
If we take the indirect effect of nonagricultural spending on agricultural growth into account, but do not 
assume improvements in spending efficiency, the rate of required growth in total spending is even higher. 
Clearly, the Nigerian government must improve its investment efficiency through improved budgetary 
process, timely release of funds, greater transparency, and strengthened accountability of public spending 
in the sector in order to effectively support the accelerated agricultural growth needed to help the country 
meet MGD1. Increasing agricultural investment efficiency by 70 percent (i.e. the marginal effect of 
spending on agricultural growth rises from the current 0.24 to 0.41) will significantly decrease the 
required growth in both agricultural spending and total spending, yielding goals that may be more 
realistically achievable by mobilizing additional resources generated by the economic growth. 
The third part of the study uses household-level data to focus on the interaction of agricultural 
service provisions and the increased use of modern inputs to improve agricultural productivity. This 
empirical analysis reveals that access to agricultural services (e.g., extension and credit) is still very 
limited in Nigeria, and that there are considerable variations in such access across the geopolitical zones 
and states of Nigeria. This situation is obviously not consistent with the targeted growth in agriculture, for 
which strong public intervention in agricultural service provision is required. Our between-state analysis 
of the variations in the provision of agricultural service projects shows that about 49 percent of 
communities in Nigeria received at least one agricultural service project between 2001 and 2005. 
However, the provision of agricultural service projects varied significantly across the states of Nigeria. 
There was also a significant correlation (0.62) in the provisions of government-run and private sector-run 
projects. 
We also found a strong positive relationship between agricultural service access and agricultural 
input (fertilizer) use, further emphasizing the importance of improving agricultural service provision for 
accelerated agricultural growth. Again, the analysis reveals significant differences in input use across the 
states of Nigeria. These differences are robust even after we control for important household- and 
community-level characteristics. The differences in fertilizer use are especially disturbing given that the 
federal government emphasizes fertilizer distribution and targets sizeable expenditures toward fertilizer 
subsidies.  60 
While the empirical findings in the third part of the paper could not be directly applied to the 
public investment estimation in the second part of the paper due to the qualitative nature of the data, 
certain similarities may be seen in the results of these analyses. For example, the efficiency of spending 
on agricultural services is low in Nigeria, whether measured by a low growth-to-spending elasticity or by 
a low access rate of farmers to agricultural services. Obviously, improvements in the efficiency of 
spending and agricultural service provision among the three tiers of government will be necessary if the 
country hopes to achieve the agricultural growth and poverty reduction goals set by the federal 
government.   
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APPENDIX A:  MATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF THE DCGE MODEL OF 
NIGERIA 
Table A.1. DCGE model sets and parameters 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Set       




Activities with a Leontief 





  Commodities    Factors 
  Commodities with domestic sales 
of domestic output   
Institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
  Commodities not in CD    Domestic institutions 
  Exported commodities    
Domestic non-
government institutions 
  Commodities not in CE    Subnational regions/zones 
  Aggregate imported commodities     
  Commodities not in CM    Households 
Parameters       
  Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI 
  Quantity of stock change 
  Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index   
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
  Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a   




Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit of c’ produced and 
sold domestically 
 
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
  Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’ 
 
Share of net income of i’ 
to i (i’ ∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
  Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’  
  Tax rate for activity a 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
 
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i 
  Import tariff rate 
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially flexed 
direct tax rates 
   Rate of sales tax 
      Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
 
aA ∈ () c CT C ∈⊂
() a ALEO A ∈⊂ () c CX C ∈⊂
cC ∈ fF ∈
() c CD C ∈⊂ i INS ∈
() c CDN C ∈⊂ () i INSD INS ∈⊂
() c CE C ∈⊂ () i INSDNG INSD ∈⊂
() c CEN C ∈⊂
() c CM C ∈⊂
() c CMN C ∈⊂ () h H INSDNG ∈⊂





' cc icd if shif
' cc ice ' ii shii
' cc icm a ta
a inta i tins
a iva i tins01
i mps c tm
i mps01 c tq
   if trnsfr62 
Table A.2. DCGE model elasticities, coefficients, and exogenous variables 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Greek symbols (elasticities and shift coefficients)      
  Efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function    CET function share parameter 
  Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function    CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
  Shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function    Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
  Armington function shift parameter    Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
  CET function shift parameter       CES production function exponent 
 
Capital sectoral mobility factor    CES value-added function exponent 
 
Marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed commodity c for 
household h 
  Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
  CES activity function share parameter    Armington function exponent 
  Share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function    CET function exponent 
  Armington function share parameter    Sector share of new capital 
  Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous variables     
  Consumer price index    
Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for 
base) 
 
Change in domestic institution tax 
share (= 0 for base; exogenous 
variable) 
  Quantity supplied of factor 
   Foreign savings (FCU)   
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
 
Government consumption adjustment 
factor   
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
  Investment adjustment factor     
  Export price (foreign currency)    Import price (foreign currency) 
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Table A.3. DCGE model endogenous variables 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous variables continued     
 
Average capital rental rate in 
time period t 
  Government consumption 
demand for commodity 
 
Change in domestic institution 
savings rates (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
  Quantity consumed of 
commodity c by household h 
 
Producer price index for 
domestically marketed output 
  Quantity of household home 
consumption  
  Government expenditures    Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input 
  Consumption spending for 
household 
  Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
 
Exchange rate (LCU per unit of 
FCU) 
  Quantity of investment 
demand  
  Government savings    Quantity of imports of 
commodity c 
  Quantity of factor demand     
 
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government 
institution (exogenous variable) 
 
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
  Activity price (unit gross 
revenue) 
   Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade input 
  Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically 
  Quantity of (aggregate) value-
added 
  Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically 
  Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of commodity 
  Export price (domestic 
currency) 
   Quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
  Aggregate intermediate input 
price for activity a 
  Real average factor price 
 
Unit price of capital in time 
period t     Total nominal absorption 
  Import price (domestic 
currency) 
  Direct tax rate for institution i 
(i ∈ INSDNG) 
  Composite commodity price    Transfers from institution i’ to 
i (both in the set INSDNG) 
  Value-added price (factor 
income per unit of activity) 
  Average price of factor 
  Aggregate producer price for 
commodity 
  Income of factor f 
  Producer price of commodity c 
for activity a    Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of activity    Income of domestic non-
government institution 
  Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output 
  Income to domestic institution 
i from factor f 
  Quantity of exports    Quantity of new capital by 
activity a for time period t 
 
   
a
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Table A.4. DCGE model equations 
Production and price equations   
  (1) 
  (2) 
  (3) 
  (4) 
  (5) 
  (6) 
  (7) 
  (8) 
  (9) 
  (10) 
  (11) 
  (12) 
  (13) 
  (14) 
  (15) 
  (16) 
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Table A.4. Continued 
Production and price equations   
  (18) 
  (19) 
  (20) 
  (21) 
  (22) 
  (23) 
  (24) 
  (25) 
  (26) 
  (27) 
Institutional incomes and domestic demand equations   
  (28) 
  (29) 
  (30) 
  (31) 
  (32) 
  (33) 
  (34) 




c c c c cr cr
r
PX QX PDS QD PE QE ⋅ = ⋅+ ⋅ ∑
''
'
c c c cc
c CT





1 cr cr cr c c  c
c CT
PM pwm tm EXR PQ icm
∈







c cr cr c cr c
rr
 =   + (1- ) QQ QM QD













QM PDD  =










 =    QQ QD QM +∑
( ) 1 c c c c c cr cr
r
PQ tq QQ PDD QD PM QM ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∑
( ) ' ' '' ' '
''
cc c cc c cc cc
cC
 = icm QM ice QE icd   QT QD
∈











fa f f fa
aA
YF  = WF   WFDIST QF
∈
⋅⋅ ∑
if if f r ow  f YIF  = shif YF trnsfr EXR  ⋅− ⋅ 
'
''
i i f i i i gov i row
f F i INSDNG
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr CPI trnsfr EXR
∈∈
+ + ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑
' '' ' ' i ii ii i i TRII  = shii (1-MPS ) (1-tins ) YI ⋅ ⋅⋅
( ) 11 h h ih h h
i INSDNG
EH  =  shii MPS (1-tins ) YI
∈






c c h c ch ch h c c h
cC
PQ QH  = PQ EH PQ γβ γ
∈

⋅ ⋅+⋅ − ⋅ 
 ∑
c c QINV  = IADJ qinv ⋅
c c QG  =GADJ qg ⋅66 
Table A.4. Continued 
  (36) 
System constraints and macroeconomic closures   
  (37) 
  (38) 
  (39) 
  (40) 
  (41) 
  (42) 
  (43) 
Capital accumulation and allocation equations   
  (44) 
  (45) 
  (46) 
  (47) 
  (48) 
  (49) 
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While the impact of agricultural growth on the poor can be partially captured by the DCGE model 
simulations, assessing the impact of growth on headcount poverty reduction depends on the availability of 
data that fully capture the country’s poverty distribution. A simple microsimulation module that links 
with the DCGE model was created for this purpose, based on the Nigeria Living Standards Survey (NLSS 
2003/04), the most recent national living standard survey in the country. Specifically, as household 
groups in the DCGE model are aggregated from the sample households in NLSS 2003/04, with their 
weights defined in the survey, each sampled household (with its weight) in NLSS 2003/04 can be traced 
to a particular household group defined in the DCGE model. The levels and consumption shares for the 
same commodities consumed by each sampled household are also defined using the more detailed 
consumption information included in the survey. Using such information, we create a utility (welfare) 
function for each sampled household in which the levels of consumption (in real terms) for all 
commodities become variables, while the by-commodity shares of consumption expenditure are 
parameters. This group of micro-level utility functions defined for the sampled households (which are the 
same as those in NLSS 2003/04), together with the household, zone, and rural/urban identifications, form 
a microsimulation module that we use to re-calculate the poverty headcount in each DCGE model 
simulation. 
Changes in the sampled households’ total expenditures
25
   
 over time (measured as changes in the 
utility function) cause some poor households to eventually become non-poor, when their total expenditure 
increases to a level above the poverty line. With some poor households moving from the poor to the non-
poor group, the country’s poverty headcount declines over time. To determine which sampled 
households’ total expenditures eventually rise to a level above the poverty line, it is necessary to link the 
changes in individual sampled households’ total expenditures (as a utility function in the microsimulation 
module) to the change in households’ consumption expenditures in the DCGE model (an endogenous 
outcome of the model simulation). To do this, we assume that the sampled households’ consumption 
levels for each individual commodity change proportionally to the level of the aggregate household 
group’s consumption of the same commodity, especially given that each household group in the DCGE 
model is aggregated from the same sampled households in the microsimulation module. This top-down 
linkage from the consumption pattern of a particular aggregate household in the DCGE model to that of a 
group of sampled households in the microsimulation module allows the microsimulation module to reflect 
the differential income and price effects across the sampled households when determining the new levels 
and patterns of consumption expenditures (and welfare levels). However, as the consumption of the 
sampled households in a particular group is proportional to that of the particular aggregated household 
representing them in the DCGE model, the microsimulation module is unable to capture the income-
distribution effects within each group. With this caveat in mind, the microsimulation module yields a new 
level of total expenditure for all sampled households, allowing us to re-calculate the poverty headcount 
for different types of rural and urban household groups as well as for the country as a whole.   
                                                       
25 Total expenditure is used to determine whether a particular sampled household is poor or not. Here, the poverty line is 
defined according to total expenditure instead of household income, as the latter is often less accurate in living standard surveys, 
compared to the level of total expenditure. 68 
APPENDIX B:  ESTIMATED ELASTICITY OF AGRICULTURAL TFP WITH RESPECT 
TO AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SPENDING  
We estimate elasticities using time-series data on agricultural TFP from Nin and Yu (2008) as the 
dependent variable, and agricultural and nonagricultural spending data as the independent variables. 
Assuming the TFP function to be of the Cobb-Douglas type, we perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression using the following formula: 
ln (TFP) =   +  * ln ( ) +  *ln (  ) +   
where   and   are the “agricultural-growth-agricultural-expenditure elasticity” and “agricultural-
growth-nonagricultural-expenditure elasticity,” respectively, and   is the error or disturbance term.  
For comparison, we used two sets of spending data: (1) data from Fan et al. (2008); and (2) a 
combination of data from CBN (2009), CBN (2007, 2008), and IMF (various years). We also control for 
the three sub-periods (pre-SAP, SAP, and post-SAP) in the estimation by assigning dummy variables (i.e. 
sub-period = 1 if 1984 <= year <=1994; 0 otherwise). In total, we estimate 28 equations (e.g., we use both 
data sets to estimate 14 equations corresponding to the dummy variables) 
The estimated coefficients are shown in Table A5. Even given the acknowledged lack of 
consistent and good quality agricultural spending data for Nigeria, the estimated elasticity shown under 
“data from Fan et al. (2008)” for   (with a value of 0.236) seems to be reasonable. As explained in 
Section 5.3, the value of 0.462 for   is not consistent with the historical trends of growth in agricultural 
and nonagricultural spending. A value of 0.14 for   is instead used in the analysis and the calibration 
method used to obtain this value is discussed in Section 5.3.   
Table A.5. Estimated elasticities of agricultural TFP with respect to agricultural and 
nonagricultural spending, 1980-2007 
Dummy variable 
Data from combined sources  Data from Fan et al. (2008) 
  P>|t|    P>|t|    P>|t|    P>|t| 
(1)  No dummy variable  0.033  0.673  0.546  0.008  0.045  0.530  0.520 0.011** 
                   
(2)  = 1 if 1984 <= year <=1994; 0 otherwise   0.480  0.625  0.490  0.045  0.168  0.043** 0.214  0.357 
(3)  = 1 if year >= 1995; 0 otherwise  -0.127 0.029** 0.196  0.169  -0.120  0.117  0.156  0.374 
(4)  = 1 if 1984 <= year <= 1994 & year >=1995;   -0.031  0.685  0.057  0.758  -0.069  0.852  0.013  0.972 
  0 otherwise                 
                   
(5)  = 1 if year <= 1984; 0 otherwise  0.067  0.363  0.465 0.026** -0.036  0.561  0.592 0.006*** 
(6)  = 1 if 1984 <= year <= 1995; 0 otherwise  0.092  0.373  0.564 0.025**  0.193  0.021** 0.295  0.206 
(7)  = year <= 1984 & 1984 <= year <= 1995;   0.084  0.209  0.081  0.620  0.022  0.646  0.238  0.096* 
  0 otherwise                 
                   
(8)  = 1 if 1984 <= year <= 1996; 0 otherwise  0.174  0.109  0.721 0.006*** 0.236 0.004*** 0.462 0.045** 
(9)  = 1 if year <= 1984 & 1984 <= year <= 1996;   0.086  0.267  0.070  0.711  0.034  0.529  0.257  0.109 
  0 otherwise                 
                   
(10) =1 if 1986 <= year <= 1994; 0 otherwise  0.043  0.651  0.571 0.011**  0.152  0.067*  0.426 0.037** 
(11) = 1 if year >= 1995; 0 otherwise  -0.127 0.029** 0.196  0.169  -0.120  0.117  0.156  0.374 
(12) = 1 if 1986 <= year <= 1994 & year >= 1995;   -0.018  0.749  0.084  0.512  -0.063  0.733  0.003  0.989 
  0 otherwise                 
                   
(13) = 1 if year >= 1994; 0 otherwise  -0.111 0.023** 0.271 0.030** -0.083  0.216  0.258  0.107 
(14) = 1 if year >= 1996; 0 otherwise  -0.158 0.012** 0.135  0.372  -0.168  0.032** 0.070  0.696 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 69 
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